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INTRODUCTION
As the first state to prohibit slavery by constitution, and one of the few
states which, from its inception, extended the vote to male citizens who did
not own land, the State of Vermont has long been at the forefront of this
nation's march toward full equality for all of its citizens. In July 1997,
three same-sex couples challenged Vermont to act as a leader yet again, this
time in affording full civil rights to the State's gay and lesbian citizens.
Stan Baker and Peter Harrigan, Nina Beck and Stacy Jolles, and Holly
Puterbaugh and Lois Farnham were denied marriage licenses by their re-
spective town clerks in the summer of 1997. They sued the State of
Vermont and the towns, arguing that the marriage statutes allowed them
to marry, and that if the law did purport to limit marriage to different sex
unions it would be unconstitutional The trial court dismissed their claims
in December 1997, and the couples appealed to the Vermont Supreme
Court. The court heard oral arguments on the case on November 18,
1998.
The Appellants' primary constitutional claim is based on the
"Common Benefits Clause" of the Vermont Constitution, which prohibits
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the State from passing laws for the particular "emolument or advantage" of
a "part only of [the] community. "' The Vermont Supreme Court has used
an analytical framework similar to federal equal protection law in apply-
ing the Common Benefits Clause, although in some cases that court has
scrutinized classifications more closely than might be required under fed-
eral law.2
In contrast to the State of Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin, where the
State argued that its laws did not discriminate, the State of Vermont ar-
ticulated its rationales in support of the discriminatory marriage laws at
the outset of the Baker v. State litigation, affording the couples the first
real opportunity to flesh out in some depth not only the appropriate level of
scrutiny, but also the State's lack of an adequate justification under any
standard. The couples" opening brief delves into the State' explanations for
its discriminatory laws in some depth, arguing that even absent heightened
scrutiny, the State could not justifJ its discriminatory marriage laws. The
opening brief also lays out three arguments for heightened scrutiny, based
on the State's gender discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination,
and impingement on afrndamental right-the right to marry.
In their reply brief, to be published in the Michigan Journal of
Gender & Law, Volume 6, Issue 1, the couples expand on their height-
ened scrutiny arguments and focus on some of the key issues raised in the
State's brief, including the relationship between procreation and marriage,
the impact on law and society of recognizing the couples' marriages, and
the role of the courts in this highly charged debate.
Susan Murray and Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool in
Middlebury, Vermont, and Mary Bonauto of Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders in Boston, Massachusetts, represented the three couples.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Holly Puterbaugh and Lois Farnham celebrated their 25th anni-
versary in October 1997. They reside with their adopted teenage
daughter in Milton, where they run a Christmas tree farm together.
Holly is a college instructor; Lois, who was born in Jay and raised on a
farm in Rutland County, is the superintendent of school nurses in a
Vermont school district.
1. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
2. See infra note 87.
3. Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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Nina Beck and Stacy Jolles live in South Burlington. Nina is a
physical therapist, and Stacy works as a director of a transitional living
program for teenagers; they have been together as a committed couple
for nearly eight years, and raised their son Noah together until he died
of heart failure last year at age two and a half.
Peter Harrigan is a college professor and Stan Baker is a depart-
ment director in a county mental health agency; they live together in
Shelburne, and have been in a committed relationship for over four
years.
Each of these couples seeks to marry for the same mix of reasons
as many heterosexual couples choose to marry. They wish to declare
their love and commitment; their lives are joined in every respect,
from merged families, to joint home ownership, to mutual economic
and emotional support; they want the legal responsibilities and protec-
tions that accompany civil marriage, and, in some cases, they hope to
promote a stable environment for raising children.
These couples (collectively "Appellants") have duly applied for
marriage licenses from their respective town clerks. All three of the
clerks refused to issue a license, claiming that same-gender couples 4 are
not entitled to legally marry in Vermont. Other than the fact that each
Appellant wants to marry a person of the same sex, each of the couples
is qualified under the'laws of the State of Vermont to apply for a li-
cense to marry and to contract for such marriage.
The Appellants filed suit against the State of Vermont and their
respective towns in July 1997, seeking a Declaratory Judgment pro-
viding that Appellees' refusals to issue them marriage licenses violate
Vermont's marriage statutes and Constitution, and an injunction pro-
hibiting Appellees from denying Appellants the requested marriage
licenses.
On December 19, 1997, the Chittenden Superior Court granted
the Motion to Dismiss filed by the State of Vermont, the Town of
Shelburne, and the City of South Burlington, and denied Appellants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On January 22, 1998, the trial
court also granted Judgment on the Pleadings to the Town of Milton
and entered a final Judgment in the case. Appellants filed a timely No-
tice of Appeal to this Court.
4. A prohibition of marriages for same-gender couples is, by definition, a prohibition of
marriages by gay and lesbian couples. For purposes of this Brief, the terms "same-
gender couples," "same-sex couples," and "gay and lesbian couples" are used inter-
changeably.
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On appeal, Appellants contend that the superior court erred in
concluding that Vermont's marriage statutes do not permit marriages
between partners of the same gender,' and in concluding that the
Vermont Constitution allows the State to deny Appellants the freedom
to marry their chosen partners.6
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(1) Do Vermont's marriage statutes, construed in light of
their purposes and constitutional limitations, require
Appellee towns to issue marriage licenses to the Appel-
lants?
(2) Does the Vermont Constitution permit the State to deny
Appellants the freedom to marry their respective chosen
partners?
ARGUMENT'
This case involves one of the most fundamental of all our human
and civil rights: the right to marry the person we love, the person with
whom we want to share our lives. At stake is far more than a mere cer-
tificate. Civil marriage,' recognized by the State, gives rise to a broad
panoply of legal, economic and social protections and supports for
married couples and their families, and imposes legal responsibilities
on married couples in addition to the moral obligations they have as-
sumed by virtue of their mutual commitment. In fact, Vermont's laws
contain hundreds of provisions relating to marriage or marital status,
assigning dozens of protections, supports and obligations to married
individuals and couples.
5. See Opinion and Order at 4-7; Appellant's Printed Case [hereinafter PC] at 257-60.
6. See PC, supra note 5, at 260-70.
7. In reviewing the superior court's dismissal of Appellants' daims, this Court must
assume that the factual allegations in the Complaint, see PC, supra note 5, at 1, are
true. See Vt. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Association of Haystack Property Owners, Inc. v.
Sprague, 145 Vt. 443 (1985). The trial court's dismissal must be reversed if this
Court determines that the Appellants have stated any conceivable claim for relief un-
der Vermont law.
8. We use the term "civil marriage' to emphasize that Appellants are not seeking to
require any religious communities or denominations to bless their unions if they do
not wish to do so.
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Some of these laws acknowledge the primacy of one's legal spouse.
For instance, Vermont's inheritance laws provide numerous protec-
tions for the surviving spouse of a decedent.9 If a patient becomes
incapacitated, physicians routinely defer to the wishes of a patient's
spouse concerning medical care and treatment, the patient's spouse
enjoys presumptive visiting privileges in the hospital, and a legal
spouse is more likely to be appointed guardian.' A surviving spouse
has the legal right to control his or her spouse's bodily remains."
The laws respect the marital relationship by protecting confiden-
tial marital communications, 12 allowing spouses to own real property as
tenants by the entirety, 3 exempting transfers between spouses from
property transfer tax liability, 4 and guaranteeing work leave to care for
a seriously ill spouse. 5
The law also seeks to keep married couples together by providing
that they cannot terminate a marriage on demand, but rather must
overcome legal and practical roadblocks to divorce. 6 When married
couples do part ways, they have recourse to a special family court,
7
and that court applies specific procedures and rules of law designed to
deal with marital breakups. 8 Among other things, these family courts
apply laws which impose legal obligations on an economically stronger
spouse, and help to protect an economically vulnerable spouse upon
dissolution of a marriage.19
The laws recognize the economic interdependence of married
partners by treating them as an economic unit. While marriage offers
9. For example, a surviving spouse is entitled to at least one-third of the decedent's per-
sonal estate, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 401 (1989); may keep the household goods
and furnishings after the decedent's death, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 403 (1989);
can receive financial support from the decedent's estate pending settlement of the es-
tate, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 404 (1989); is eititled to at least one-third of the
value of decedent's real estate, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 461, 474 (1989); may
bccupy the decedent's real estate pending the necessary divisions, see VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 470 (1989); and is entitled to intestate succession, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 551(2) (1989).
10. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3072 (1989).
11. See Nichols v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., 94 Vt. 14, 16 (1919).
12. SeeVT. R. EVD. § 504; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1973).
13. See Bellows Falls Trust Co. v. Gibbs, 148 Vt. 633 (1987).
14. SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9603(5) (1991).
15. SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 471-473 (1987 & Supp. 1998).
16. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1989) (listing grounds for divorce).
17. SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 451 (1988).
18. SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 511-594 (1989 & Supp. 1998).
19. SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 751-752 (1989).
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some couples tax benefits, the combined income tax liability of many
couples rises, rather than falls, as a result of their marriage. 20 Moreover,
a married person who might otherwise qualify may be disqualified
from receiving certain means-tested government benefits, such as
* 22ANFC 2' or General Assistance, due to his or her spouse's income.
Finally, the individual and collective social value of state-
recognized civil marriage should not be minimized.'
The suggestion that two adults who love one another and wish to
assume the commitment and responsibilities of civil marriage can be
denied the right to do so undermines the purpose and the very mission
of Vermont's marriage laws. As set forth more fully below, Vermont's
marriage laws, properly construed in light of their underlying purposes
and in a manner that avoids constitutional problems, do permit mar-
riages between partners of the same gender.24
Moreover, if Vermont's marriage laws are construed to deny Ap-
pellants the right to marry, those laws fly in the face of the guarantees
of inclusion and freedom embodied in the Vermont Constitution. In
particular, the "Common Benefits Clause" of the Vermont Constitu-
tion provides powerful protection against unjustified discrimination.25
The State's purported justifications for its discrimination do not even
satisfy the most deferential review of discriminatory classifications," let
alone the more stringent scrutiny applicable in this case.27
20. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAx 1 (June 1997).
21. Aid for Needy Families With Children.
22. See, e.g., VERMONT DEI'T OF Soc. WuLFAR, BULLETIN No. 96-39F; 13 VT. CODE
R. 170 at 003-58 to 003-60.1 (1996).
23. This Court has noted the psychic importance of the State's recognizing meaningful
family relationships, and the damage that flows from the State's refusal to do so. Re-
jecting a law placing adopted children on different footing from their non-adopted
siblings, the Court wrote, "The message of [the law] is invidious and discriminatory.
He is a member of the family, yet he is not, and the realization of this fact by him
and other members of the family leaves an area of rejection which is, in many in-
stances, more important psychologically than is concern over material values."
MacCaum v. Seymour's Admin., 165 Vt. 452, 460 (1996) (internal quotations
omitted).
24. See infra Section I.
25. See infra Section II.
26. See infra Section III.
27. See infra Section IV.
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I. VERMONT'S MARRIAGE STATUTES ALLOW MARRIAGES
BETWEEN PERSONS OF THE SAME GENDER
The trial court concluded that Vermont's marriage statutes limit
marriage to different sex couples. In so construing the marriage stat-
utes, the trial court failed to interpret those laws in light of their
underlying purposes, and in a manner that avoids constitutional diffi-
culties. As shown below, the primary purposes of Vermont's marriage
laws are to protect, encourage, and support the unions of committed
couples, and thereby also provide a stable environment for those cou-
ples to raise children, if they have them. Since those purposes apply
equally to all committed couples, whether they are of the same sex or
different sexes, Vermont's marriage statutes must be interpreted to al-
low the Appellants to marry.
A. The Marriage Laws Must Be Construed to Pro-
mote Their Underlying Purposes
This Court has repeatedly recognized that in construing a statute a
court must consider the language of the statute in light of the statute's un-
derlying purposes. Even the "plain meaning rule," like all other rules of
statutory construction, must be applied in the context of determining the
underlyingpurpose of the law.
Thus, in interpreting a statute a court must "analyz[e] not only its lan-
guage, but also its purpose, effects and consequences." 29 The fundamental
goal is to ascertain the law's underlying purpose-its "reason and spirit"30
In fact, this Court has explicitly ruled that when the literal words or
apparent "plain meaning" of a statute conflict with its underlying pur-
pose, the "plain meaning' cannot be applied!'
For example, in 1993 this Court held that, despite the literal words
in the statute, a woman who was co-parenting two children with her
same-sex partner should be allowed to adopt the children as a "step-
28. See Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 148 Vt. 47, 50 (1987) ("all rules of con-
struction rely on a determination of legislative.., purpose").
29. Estate of Frant v. Haystack Group, Inc., 162 Vt. 11, 14 (1994).
30. Merkel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 166 Vt. 311, 314 (1997) (quoting Lane v. Town of
Grafton, 166 Vt. 148, 151 (1997)).
31. See State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26, 31 (1993) ("'the letter of a statute or its literal
sense must yield where it conflicts with legislative purpose.'") (quoting Lubinsky, 148
Vt. at 49-50).
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parent" in order to create a legal relationship between the children and
both of the adults. 2 In reaching its decision, this Court acknowledged
that it was unlikely that the legislature had ever contemplated the pros-
pect of adoptions by same-gender couples when it enacted the adoption
laws at issue in the 1940s."3 Rather than simply rule that the laws pro-
hibited such adoptions, however, this Court decided that they were
neither "specifically prohibited [nior specifically allowed,"3 and that the
underlying purposes of the adoption laws must therefore be examined to
determine what the laws were "designed to accomplish."35
This Court then found that the underlying purpose of the adoption
law was not to prohibit certain combinations of individuals (such as les-
bian couples) from adopting, but rather was to provide legal security for
children. Since the requested adoptions were "entirely consistent" with
the functional purpose of the adoption laws, this Court ruled that they
36were permitted under the adoption statute.
In the present case, the trial court concluded that the "plain
meaning" rule of statutory construction requires the prohibition of
marriages between partners of the same gender. In support of its con-
clusion, the trial court cited historical dictionary definitions; the one
subsection in Vermont's detailed marriage licensing scheme which
contains some gender-based language;37 sections in Title 15 prohibiting
32. See In re B.LV.B., 160 Vt. 368 (1993).
33. See In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. at 372.
34. In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. at 372.
35. Id.
36. In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. at 372-73.
37. Vermont's statutory scheme for marriage is contained in Chapter 1 of Tide 15 of the
Vermont Statutes Annotated, which determines the requisites of a valid marriage and
the eligibility of individuals to marry, and Chapter 105 of Title 18 of the Vermont
Statutes Annotated, which prescribes the forms and procedures for obtaining a license
and solemnizing a marriage. Chapter 105 of Title 18 of the Vermont Statutes Anno-
tated contains fourteen sections and numerous subsections. One of those subsections
requires a couple to obtain a marriage license from the derk in the town where either
the "bride or groom" resides. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5131(a) (1987). With the
exception of this subsection (and its companion section, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5005 (1987), relating to issuance of licenses to residents of unorganized towns or
gores) and the consanguinity statutes (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1-3 (1989)) all
other sections of Vermont's marriage statutes are gender neutral, referring only to
"person," "party," or "applicant" rather than to the specific gender of the individual.
1999]
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consanguineous marriages which are gender-based; s and references to
"husband" and "wife" in various other Vermont laws.39
Appellants do not deny that some statutes establishing legal pro-
tections, supports and obligations for married persons contain gender-
based references. 0 Moreover, Appellants readily acknowledge that,
historically, marriage in Vermont has been assumed to be between a
man and a woman, and, until the filing of this lawsuit, no Vermont
couple had ever challenged that assumption.4'
38. Appellants recognize that when enacting the consanguinity statutes (VT. STAT. ANN.
tic. 15 §§ 1-3 (1989)), the legislature did not expressly consider the possibility of
marriages between same-gender partners, so the consanguinity laws do not expressly
prohibit marriages between, for example, a mother and her daughter. The policy
which underlies the consanguinity statutes, however, applies equally to same and dif-
ferent gender couples: the maintenance of a bright line distinction between filial
relationships and sexually intimate ones. See Developments in the Law: The Constitu-
tion and the Family, 93 HAov. L. Rnv. 1156, 1267 (1980) (restrictions on
consanguineous marriages discourage family members from viewing each other as
sexual partners and thereby "prevent the exploitation of the family relationship as an
opportunity for sex without meaningful consent"). Presumably, the legislature would
amend the consanguinity statutes upon legal recognition of marriages between part-
ners of the same gender to remedy the statutory idiosyncracy.
39. See PC, supra note 5, at 257-60. The State has also argued that legislative intent to
deny the Appellants the right to marry can somehow be inferred from the fact that in
1787 Vermont adopted the English common law, which in turn was based on eccle-
siastical law, which the State claims did not allow marriages between same-sex
couples. See State of Vermont's Motion to Dismiss [hereinafter State's Motion] at 18;
PC, supra note 5, at 24. The State's argument is puzzling, given our strong constitu-
tional tradition against state establishment of religion, the fact that the Appellants are
not seeking to force any particular religions to approve or celebrate their marriages,
and the fact that common law is not frozen in time, but evolves with changing social
conditions. See I. & E. Builders, Inc. v. Chandler, 144 Vt. 302 (1984) (recognizing
evolution of common law with respect to rights and roles of marriage partners).
40. However, the trial court's reliance on gendered terms in the statutes ignores the leg-
islature's direction that Vermont's statutes should be interpreted in a gender-neutral
way. In particular, the legislature has directed that "words importing the masculine
may extend and be applied to the persons of the feminine gender." VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 175 (1995).
41. The Appellants also point out, however, that the word "marriage" is not defined
anywhere in our statutes. Further, colloquial use of the word "marriage" to describe
relationships between same-sex partners has become increasingly common in our so-
ciety, as indicated by Vermont newspaper editorials and commentators who have
written on the topic, many before the instant lawsuit was filed. See, e.g., Andy
Kirkaldy, Marriage Bill is Indefensible, ADDISON CoUir INDEP., July 18, 1996, at
4A; Nicholas Fersen, Where is the Threat from Same-Sex Marriages?, BENNINGTON
BANNER, Jan. 27, 1997, at 14; Editorial, Hawaii Leads the Way, BRXATI.EoRO RE-
FOamER, Dec. 9, 1996, at 4; Steve Cusik, State Should Recognize Same-Sex Marriages,
(FRANKIN) CoUNTY COURIER, July 31, 1997, at 10; Cathleen Palumbo, Separate-
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However, nothing in Vermont's statutory scheme explicitly pro-
hibits couples of the same gender from marrying."2 In fact, the
Vermont legislature probably never contemplated unions between
same-gender partners, since the basic structure of Vermont's marriage
laws was created even before Vermont became a state in 1791. Under
these circumstances, In re B.L.VB. compels the conclusion that such
marriages are "[n]either specifically prohibited [n]or specifically al-
lowed,"4 3 and requires this Court to examine the underlying purposes
of the marriage statutes-what they were "designed to accomplish."" If
the marriages being requested by the Appellants are consistent with the
underlying purposes of the marriage laws, then this Court must allow
them to take place. 5
B. The Purpose of the Marriage Laws Is to Regulate,
Protect, and Support Committed Couples and
Their Families
No one would deny that marriage is "a vitally important human
institution" and "one of the oldest forms of social organization. " 46 Even
But-EquaJ MANCHESTER J., Nov. 13, 1997, at 8; Paul Bortz, Legalize Gay Marriages,
RUTLAND HERALD, May 20, 1997, at 11; Emerson Lynn, Same-Sex Union Should Not
Be Issue in Vermont, ST. ALBANS MESSENGER, July 23, 1997, at 4; Editorial, The
Right to Many, VERmoNT TIMES, Aug. 20, 1997, at 8.
42. Nothing in Tide 15 or Tide 18 expressly prohibits marriages between people of the
same gender. In the absence of such an explicit prohibition, the rules of statutory
construction do not allow such a disqualification to be implied. See In re Henry, 135
Bankr. Rep. 6 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991); Grenafege v. Department of Employment Sec.,
134 Vt. 288, 290, (1976)(holding that in interpreting statutes, the rule of statutory
construction entitled "expressio unius est exdusio alterius"--indusion of one thing
implies the exclusion of others-must apply).
43. In re B.LV.B., 160 Vt. 368 (1993).
44. In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. at 372.
45. See State v. Eckhardt, 165 Vt. 606, 606 n.2 (1996) (driveway considered "highway"
for purposes of DUI laws,'even though "highway" defined in statute as "place ...
open to ... public or general circulation of vehicles"; broad construction of word
"highway" appropriate given fact that purpose of DUI laws is to prevent injury to
public by drunk drivers); State v. Begins, 148 Vt. 186 (1987) (DUI statute inter-
preted to allow prosecution in absence of police request for breath or blood test, even
though statutory language mandated such request; Court held that literal language
contravenes underlying purpose of law, which is to protect public from drunk driv-
ers).
46. Samuel Green & John V. Long, MARRUGE AND FAmILY LAW AGREEMENTS §1.01
(1984).
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in the early eighteenth century, this Court recognized that "[t]o marry
is one of the natural rights of human nature."
47
The State confers legal status on the institution of marriage
through statutory enactments. The purposes of those statutes have
changed, however, as the institution itself has evolved in American so-
ciety. For example, during colonial and frontier times, marriage
functioned as an economic producing unit of society with responsi-
bilities for child rearing and training."
In other words, when America was an agrarian society, one of the
central goals of marriage was "procreation," as this "was important for
survival and economic progress" of the family and the larger society.4
Over the last century, however, the institution of marriage has
evolved as America has developed from a largely agrarian and rural so-
ciety to a more modern, urban one.50 The fact that married women can
now own property and enter into contracts is reflective of that chang-
ing conception of marriage and the purposes of marriage. 5'
As our society has become more modern and complex, marriage
has come to serve a multiplicity of purposes. For many people, in-
cluding Appellants Nina Beck and Stacy Jolles, and Holly Puterbaugh
and Lois Farnham, marriage serves the purpose of creating a legally
recognized family unit in which to raise children. 52 The many benefits
47. Overseers of the Poor of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151,
159 (1829).
48. See STEVEN Mi=nz & SUsAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REvOLurONS: A SocIAL HISTORY
OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE xviii (1988) (during colonial times, the family was largely
"an interdependent unit of labor in which all family members contributed to a col-
lective 'family economy.'").
49. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SExuAL LIB-
ERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 130 (1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE].
50. See ESKRIDGE, SA E-SEx MARRIAGE, supra note 49, at 130.
51. See R.& E. Builders, Inc. v. Chandler, 144 Vt. 302, 304 (1984) (noting that histori-
cally a married woman's "legal existence" was suspended and merged into that of her
husband's, and citing modern day changes to those old laws); Mirz & KELLOGG, su-
pra note 48, at xix (a major force for familial change lies in transformation of
women's roles).
52. Creating a legally recognized family structure in which to raise children is a purpose
of marriage which in past days was commonly expressed simply as "procreation."
Such a shorthand notion to describe the process of raising children was expedient
during a time when virtually all couples became parents by conceiving a child to-
gether. However, given the advancements in modern reproductive technologies and
the evolution of adoption as an open, accepted, and commonplace event in our soci-
ety, many couples today, both heterosexual and gay and lesbian, become parents
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and protections accorded to the status of civil marriage by the State
assist in making marriage a desirable context for child rearing.
53
Another key purpose of marriage has come to be its emphasis on
commitment and sharing between married partners. 54 Thus, in 1965
the United States Supreme Court declared that
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.55
More recently, in a case affirming a prison inmate's right to
marry, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that marriage serves
many important purposes, and, without mentioning procreation,
stated that one of those key purposes is emotional sharing and mutual
commitment:
Many important attributes of marriage remain ... after tak-
ing into account the limitations imposed by prison life. First,
inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional sup-
port andpublic commitment. These elements are an important
and significant aspect of the marital relationship. In addition,
... the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of relig-
ious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication....
Finally, marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of
government benefits ... property rights ... and other, less
tangible benefits .... 56
without actually conceiving the child together. See MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r,
165 Vt. 452, 455-56 (1996); Section III.A.4.
53. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 3,
1996)(concluding that civil marriage licenses should be available to couples of the
same gender because, among other things, marriage would be beneficial to children
being reared by same-gender couples).
54. See Mnmz & KELLOGG, supra note 48, at xv-xvi (by early 20th century the new ideal
of family life became "companionate" marriage in which relations were based on
"affection and mutual interest").
55. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965)(upholding married couple's
right not to procreate through use of contraceptives).
56. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (emphasis added).
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As the institution of marriage has evolved from one simply fo-
cused on producing sufficient numbers of children to ensure economic
survival, to one concerned with supporting the emotional, associa-
tional, and familial goals of marriage, marriage laws have likewise
evolved to mirror the change. Thus, for example, duties of support
have been modified, property rights have changed, and no-fault di-
vorce laws have made it much easier for spouses to dissolve their
relationships.5 7
In contrast to earlier times, the primary purpose of our late-20th-
century marriage laws is to recognize, protect, and support those cou-
ples who are willing to make a mutual commitment to share their lives
together. The marriage laws promote this purpose by providing a vari-
ety of statutory benefits, supports and protections, and by imposing
legal obligations on married couples." In short, Vermont's marriage
laws, like the adoption laws at issue in In re B.L. VB., are intended to
"protect the security of [existing] family units" by delineating the legal
rights and responsibilities of the parties to that marriage."
C. Marriages between Same-Gender Couples Are
Entirely Consistent with the Purposes of the
Marriage Statutes
Given the underlying purposes of our marriage laws, there is no
reason or justification for denying legal marriage to same-gender cou-
ples who want to marry. In fact, allowing committed same-sex couples
to legally marry is "entirely consistent" with the "general intent and
spirit" of Vermont's marriage laws.6 On the other hand, to deny Ap-
pellants (and other same-gender couples who are willing to make a
mutual commitment to support, share, and care for one another as a
family) the legal protections and obligations derived from civil mar-
riage, is contrary to the intent and spirit of those laws.
The fact that no same-gender couples have heretofore been pro-
vided the protections and supports of Vermont's marriage laws does
not mean that this prohibition should continue any longer. This Court
has admonished that "[w]hen social mores change, governing statutes
57. See GLENDA RiLEY, DIVORCE: AN AAERICAN TRADITON 161-68 (1991).
58. See RLEY, supra note 57, at 3-5.
59. See In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368, 373 (1993).
60. In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. at 373.
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must be interpreted to allow for those changes in a manner that does
not frustrate the purposes behind their enactment."
6'
Here in Vermont, social mores have changed. Gay men and les-
bian women have become increasingly more integrated into the larger
society and "its spheres of business, religion, recreation, and educa-
tion, 62 and various Vermont laws reflect the fact that our community
no longer permits either discrimination or violence against gay men
and lesbian women.
63
In light of the changing social mores in the State of Vermont, it
would be unjust and unreasonable to construe Vermont's marriage
statutes to exclude same-sex couples. As this Court proclaimed in In re
B.L. VB., "This is not a matter which arises in a vacuum. Social frag-
mentation and the myriad configurations of modern families have
presented us with new problems and complexities that can not be
solved by idealizing the past.""
D. The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Marriage
Laws Raises Serious Constitutional Problems
Finally, "[A] statute should, if it reasonably can, be so construed
as to avoid any conflict with the constitution., 65 This Court should
interpret Vermont's marriage statutes to permit Appellants to marry
because a contrary interpretation would raise serious constitutional
problems.66
61. In re B.LV.B., 160 Vt. at 375.
62. EsIGuDGE, SAME-SEX: MARRiAGF, supra note 49, at 8.
63. Thus, for example, the Vermont legislature has enacted laws prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 495 (1987); housing, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503(a) (1993); public accom-
modations, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(a) (1993); insurance, credit services, see
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1211 (1984); agricultural finance leases, see VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 2488 (1993); and retail installment contracts, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§§ 2410-2362 (1993). The legislature has also increased penalties for hate crimes
motivated by the victim's actual or perceived sexual orientation, see VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 1455 (1974); and has allowed same-gender partners to adopt children, see
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (1989).
64. In re B.LV.B., 160 Vt. at 375 (quoting In the Matter of the Adoption of Evan, 583
N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)).
65. State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 373 (1987)(citing Central Vermont Ry. v. Depart-
ment of Taxes, 144 Vt. 601, 604 (1984)).
66. See infra Sections II-IV.
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
II. VERMONT HAS DEVELOPED AN INDEPENDENT CONSTITU-
TIONAL JURISPRUDENCE WHICH PROVIDES POWERFUL
PROTECTION AGAINST UNJUSTIFIED DISCRIMINATION
If, as Appellees argue, Vermont's marriage laws do not allow civil
marriages between partners of the same gender, those laws are uncon-
stitutional.
Vermont's laws and people have long embraced the values of free-
dom, equality and inclusion.67 Vermont's deep commitment to
protecting every Vermonter's inclusion in the protections of the law is
reflected in Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution ("the
Common Benefits Clause"), which provides in part: "That government
is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and
security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particu-
lar emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of
persons, who are a part only of that community .... ,,68
The provisions of the Vermont Constitution do not offer
"mathematical formulas having their essence in their form." 69 To the
contrary, as this Court has noted:
Whey are organic living institutions transplanted from Eng-
lish soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be
gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but
by considering their origin and the line of their growth."
Accordingly, in determining the contemporary effect of the
Common Benefits Clause, this Court considers, among other things,
not merely the raw text of the constitutional provision, but the
67. Vermont enjoys the distinction of being the first state to prohibit slavery. See VT.
CONST., art. I (1777); Windsor v. Jacob, 2 Tyl. 192 (1802). Unlike many states,
Vermont has never prohibited interracial marriages. Similarly, in contrast to its colo-
nial neighbors, even prior to its admission to the union, the territory of Vermont
extended suffrage to every adult male-not just property owners or those who paid a
specific tax. See WILL PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AM.RIcAN CONSTITUTIONS 196
(1980). As one Vermont legal historian has noted, "That the 1791 Bill of Rights was
appended, as an afterthought to the Nation's Constitution, contrasts sharply to Ver-
mont's Declaration of Rights which stands at the forefront of its Constitution."
Charles S. Martin, The Vermont Constitution: Past, Present and Future-Part I, VT.
B.J. & L. DIG., April 1991, at 7, 9.
68. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
69. Statev. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 225 (1985).
70. Jewett, 146 Vt. at 225-26 (internal quotations omitted).
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historical context, the approaches adopted by other courts in
interpreting comparable provisions of the federal and sibling state
constitutions, and economic and sociological materials.7' Employing
such an analysis, this Court has pledged to formulate "a state
constitutional jurisprudence that will protect the rights and liberties of
our people '72 and that will protect "not only this generation of
Vermonters but those who will come after us in the decades yet to
be.
73
A. The Common Benefits Clause Protects Commu-
nity Access to "The Fruits of the Common
Enterprise"
The Common Benefits Clause was included in the original Ver-
mont Constitution of 1777.74 The delegates at the 1777 Windsor
convention apparently borrowed the text from the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution with no documented discussion or debate,75 and the text has
remained substantially unchanged through the present.76
Although the historical record provides few clues about the specific
rationale underlying the Common Benefits Clause in particular,
historians have studied the prevailing political philosophies of the late
18th century, and the expression of those philosophies in state
constitutions. The drafters of the Vermont Constitution, like many of
their contemporary counterparts throughout colonial America,
apparently embraced what has been characterized as a "radical reading
71. SeeJewett, 146 Vt. at 226-27.
72. Jewett, 146 Vt. at 224.
73. Jewett, 146 Vt. at 229.
74. See VT. CONsr. ch. I, art. 6 (1777). In the 1786 version of the Constitution, the
Common Benefits Clause was moved from Chapter I, Artide 6 to Chapter I, Artide
7, where it has remained to this day.
75. See AD~As, supra note 67, at 94; John N. Shaeffer, A Comparison of the First Consti-
tutions of Vermont and Pennsylvania, 43 VERMoNT HisT. Soc'Y PROC. 33 (Winter
1975).
76. The only difference between the present version of the Common Benefits Clause and
the original version is that the original version used the words "man" and "men"
rather than the gender-neutral terms "person" and "persons." See VT. CONST. ch. I,
art. 6 (1777). The language was modified to include the gender-neutral terms in
1994. Art. Amend. 52 (1994). See VT. CONST. ch. II § 76. This 1994 revision was
not intended to alter the "sense, meaning or effect" of any of the sections of the Con-
stitution. See VT. CONST. ch. II § 76.
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of the contract theory."7 At the core of this view is the belief that "[i]f
the highest purpose of the social contract was to provide the individual
with a better chance to find happiness than the presocial state of
nature permitted, it seemed only logical that everybody should have an
equal share in the beneficent consequences of the contract."78 In other
words, colonial proponents of this vision of the social contract believed
that equality demanded "not only that everyone enjoy equality before
the law or have an equal voice in government, but also that everyone
have an equal share in the fruits of the common enterprise. ' 7 The
Common Benefits Clause embodies the drafters' promise of such
inclusiveness-a pledge which continues to illuminate the proper
application of the Common Benefits Clause today.
B. The Common Benefits Clause Responds to So-
cietal Changes through Time
Faithful to that promise of inclusiveness and equality, this Court
has consistently emphasized that legislative classifications which may
have made perfect sense in a prior era may not make sense in light of
modern social and economic relations. As this Court noted recently in
evaluating a Common Benefits Clause challenge to Vermont's educa-
tion financing structure, "Equal protection of the laws cannot be
limited by eighteenth-century standards. While history must inform
our constitutional analysis, it cannot bind it."8" This Court explained
that the Vermont Constitution was written in a different, less complex
era, and that "yesterday's bare [educational] essentials are no longer
sufficient to prepare a student to live in today's global marketplace."8
Similarly, in recently striking down a law providing that adopted
children could not inherit through intestate succession from collateral
relatives, this Court noted that the presumption that such a provision
77. ADAms, supra note 67, at 187.
78. ADAMS, supra note 67, at 188.
79. ADAMs, supra note 67, at 188. See also Martin, supra note 67, at 7, 8 (identifying
social contract theory roots of Vermont Constitution); Frank G. Mahady, Toward a
Theory of State Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Judge's Thoughts, 13 VT. L. Rnv. 145,
151-52 (1988) (Common Benefits Clause reflects anti-privileges attitude arising in
response to British colonial experience).
80. Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 267 (1997).
81. Brigham, 166 Vt. at 267.
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reflected the likely intentions of most decedents was no longer accurate
in light of evolving social norms. The Court explained:
In 1880, or even in 1945, the Legislature might have con-
cluded that collateral kin would expect intestate succession to
be limited to the bloodline and exclude adopted persons.
That presumption is no longer reasonable in 1996. We no
longer rely on antiquated notions of the adoptive relationship
as a civil or contractual, an artificial, as contradistinguished
from a natural status." We must acknowledge the vast cul-
tural and social changes that have occurred and their effect
on adoption practice and the public attitudes about adop-
tion. 2
In the MacCallum decision, this Court quoted at length from its
opinion in Choquette v. Perrault,3 in which this Court considered a
state law requiring a landowner of unimproved and unoccupied land
adjoining occupied land of another person to pay for a proportional
share of a fence between the lands. In striking down the law, this
Court explained:
In the context of the land-use patterns of the nineteenth
century, Vermont's fence law served the broad public interest.
Though not all Vermonters were engaged in agricultural pur-
suits, the land was predominantly open and farmed, and
most rural landowners were also livestock owners. This is not
the case today.... As a result of changing land-use patterns,
the law more and more often applies to landowners without
livestock. In such situations, the fence law is burdensome, ar-
bitrary and confiscatory, and therefore cannot pass
constitutional muster.84
This Court has recognized that family structures, like land-use
patterns, have changed dramatically since the eighteenth century, and
has thus construed Vermont's adoption statute to allow the same-
gender (and unmarried) partner of a child's legal parent to adopt as a
82. MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452, 460-61 (quoting In re Raymond
Estate, 161 Vt. 544, 548 (1994)) (citations omitted).
83. Choquette v. Perrault, 153 Vt. 45 (1989).
84. Choquette, 153 Vt. at 53-54.
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step-parent. 5 In fact, this Court further suggested that a failure to ac-
commodate changing family structures would raise constitutional
concerns: "To deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class, the
security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent
serves no legitimate state interest."86 In this case, the Common Benefits
Clause requires sensitivity to societal changes through time, as well as
contemporary family structures.
C. This Court's Analysis under the Common Bene-
fits Clause Varies Depending on the Type of
Case
In evaluating whether a challenged classification runs afoul of the
Common Benefits Clause, this Court has historically recited the ana-
lytical framework developed through federal equal protection law."
However, this Court has insisted that Vermont's Common Bene-
fits Clause may provide more extensive civil rights protections than the
federal analog.88
85. See In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368, 375 (1993) ("When social mores change, governing
statutes must be interpreted to allow for those changes in a manner that does not
frustrate the purposes behind their enactment.").
86. In re B.L.V.B. 160 Vt. at 375.
87. See, e.g., Brigham -v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 265 (1997) ("We have held that the Com-
mon Benefits Clause in the Vermont Constitution ... is generally coextensive with
the equivalent guarantee in the United States Constitution and imports similar meth-
ods of analysis."); State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, 141 Vt. 261, 268 (1982)
(describing the equal protection analysis under the Vermont Constitution as
"somewhat similar to the equal protection test of the fourteenth amendment").
88. See, e.g., Brigham, 8 166 Vt. at 257, 265 (concluding that the Vermont Constitution
proscribed a school finding arrangement similar to one upheld by the United States
Supreme Court applying the federal constitution); Hodgeman v. Jard Co., 157 Vt.
461, 464 (1991) ("[The Vermont Constitution is freestanding and may require this
Court to examine more closely distinctions drawn by state government than would
the Fourteenth Amendment."); State v. Brunelle, 148 Vt. 347, 351 (1987) (citing
Ludlow Supermarkets, 141 Vt. at 268, for the proposition that the prohibition against
preferential legislation in Article 7 is "more stringent than the federal constitutional
standard"); see also State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 448-49 (1982), in which this Court
explained:
Historically and textually, [the Vermont Constitution] differs from the
United States Constitution. It predates the federal counterpart, and it ex-
tends back to Vermont's days as an independent republic. It is an
independent authority, and Vermont's fundamental law.
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1. Classifications Founded on a Suspect
Basis, or Implicating a Fundamental
Right, Are Subject to Heightened
Scrutiny
Under the Common Benefits Clause, certain legislative classifica-
tions are subject to "strict," "heightened," or "more searching"
scrutiny.89 In particular, classifications which distinguish among people
on a "suspect" basis, or which burden a "fundamental right," are con-
stitutional only if "any discrimination occasioned by the law serves a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve
that objective.""
The State's classifications in this case are subject to heightened
scrutiny because they are founded on distinctions among classes of
people based on "suspect" factors-namely, gender and sexual orienta-
tion,9' and because they implicate a fundamental right.92 Even if the
fundamental right at issue in this case, or the nature of the class disad-
vantaged by the law, were not respectively and independently sufficient
to trigger heightened scrutiny, the combination of these two factors
would be. 93
However, this Court need not even reach the question of
heightened scrutiny. Presumably to avoid considering constitutional
questions which it need not necessarily reach, this Court generally first
considers whether a state classification can satisfy even the minimum
level of scrutiny before considering whether heightened scrutiny is
Although we have frequently treated parallel state and federal provisions in
a similar manner... we have never intimated that the meaning of the
Vermont Constitution is identical to the federal document. Indeed, we
have at times interpreted our constitution as protecting rights which were
explicitly excluded from federal protection. We are free, of course, to pro-
vide more generous protection to rights under the Vermont Constitution
than afforded by the federal charter.
Badger, 141 Vt. at 448-49 (citations omitted).
89. Brigham, 166 Vt. at 265.
90. Brigham, 166 Vt. at 265; see also MacCalum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. at 452,
457.
91. See infra Section I.A (gender classifications) and Section IV.B (sexual-orientation
discrimination).
92. See infra Section W.C.
93. See infra Section 1V.D.
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appropriate. 4 Likely because this Court's analysis under even the
minimum level of review is so exacting," this Court has rarely had
occasion to move beyond its minimum level of scrutiny in order to
apply heightened scrutiny.
2. At a Minimum, the Common Benefits
Clause Requires Both That State Clas-
sifications Be Reasonably Related to a
Valid Public Purpose, and a Careful
Balancing of the State's Interests and
the Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens
Under the Vermont Constitution, all legal classifications must, at
a bare minimum, be "reasonably related to the promotion of a valid
public purpose."96
This minimum test requires the Court to consider two distinct
questions in evaluating the constitutionality of a state classification:
First, is the public purpose offered in support of the classification at
issue a valid one? Second, are the classifications at issue reasonably re-
lated to that purpose? 7 Even under this minimum level of scrutiny, the
Court may uphold a discriminatory classification only if it answers
both questions in the affirmative.
94. See, e.g., Brigham, 166 Vt. at 265 (refraining from deciding whether education is a
fundamental right and therefore subject to more stringent scrutiny because Ver-
mont's school finding system did not satisfy the minimum test of being reasonably
related to any valid public purpose); MacCalum, 165 Vt. at 457 n.1 (declining to
consider "suspect class" claim because discrimination against adopted children was
not even reasonably related to the promotion of a valid public purpose).
95. See infra Section II.C.2.
96. Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 212 (1993). This Court has used the term "legitimate
state purpose" interchangeably with "valid public purpose" in articulating Vermont's
minimum level of review under the Common Benefits Clause. See,' e.g., Oxx v. Ver-
mont Dep't of Taxes, 159 Vt. 371, 376 (1992).
97. See Lorrain, 160 Vt. at 212.
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a. In Deciding Whether the State's
Claimed Purposes Are Valid, This
Court Must Weigh the State's Goals
against the Interests of the Citizens
Excluded or Disadvantaged by the
Discriminatory Laws
Although this Court has not expressly articulated a "balancing
test" for determining whether the State's claimed purpose is valid, in
practice this Court's analysis reflects a careful and simultaneous
"sliding scale" weighing of the interests of the citizens excluded or dis-
advantaged by the discriminatory laws on the one hand, and the
justifications offered by the State, on the other hand."
Accordingly, regardless of whether heightened scrutiny is re-
quired, when a state classification limits selected citizens from access to
an important right, or excludes unpopular groups from "the fruits of
the common enterprise, ''99 this Court's demands of the State are much
more exacting than when a state classification draws distinctions
among unremarkable categories of citizens with respect to less impor-
tant matters. For example, in the case of In re Property of One Church
Street,'0 this Court was relatively deferential to government tax classi-
fications, recognizing that economic regulations inevitably have uneven
impact.' °'
By way of contrast, in its recent decision in Brigham, this Court
emphasized the importance of educational opportunity in connection
98. Appellees' claim that this basic level of review requires nearly unrestricted deference
to presumed legislative intent is incorrect, see State's Motion, supra note 39, at 47-
51; PC, supra note 5, at 53-57, and the trial court's characterization of this level of
review as "highly deferential" are inaccurate. See PC, supra note 5, at 267. In fact, this
Court has frequently concluded that state classifications lacking a legitimate purpose
were unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lorrain, 160 Vt. 202 (1993) (statute barring third
party loss of consortium claims by spouses of injured workers while spouses of per-
sons injured outside of work could maintain such claims); Choquette v. Perrault, 153
Vt. 45 (1989)(statute requiring adjoining landowners to share cost of constructing
fence to contain livestock); State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 141 Vt. 261 (1982)
(Sunday closing law containing exceptions for certain small businesses); State v. Cadi-
gan, 73 Vt. 245, 246-47 (1900) (law requiring firms "organized under the laws of
another state" to comply with certain requirements not applicable to similar compa-
nies and firms organized under Vermont laws).
99. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
100. In re Property of One Church Street, 152 Vt. 260 (1989).
101. Id. at 264.
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with its Common Benefits Clause analysis. 0 2 Although this Court ul-
timately applied only the minimum level of scrutiny to the State's
school funding system, the Court nonetheless demanded a strong jus-
tification to rationalize the State's unequal provision of educational
opportunities-opportunities which, while not necessarily "fundamen-
tal" in the constitutional sense, were and are clearly quite important.
Concluding that the State's justifications were not strong enough to
outweigh its burdens on an important right, this Court explained:
This is not a case ... that turns on the particular constitu-
tional test to be employed. Labels aside, we are simply unable
to fathom a legitimate governmental purpose to justify the
gross inequities in educational opportunities evident from the
record. The distribution of a resource as precious as educa-
tional opportunity may not have as its determining force the
mere fortuity of a child's residence. It takes no particular con-
stitutional expertise to recognize the capriciousness of such a
SytM103system. 
°
By the same token, in the MacCallum case, this Court noted that
"[a]dopted persons have historically been a target of discrimination.
" ' °4
Although this Court applied only the minimum level of scrutiny to the
State's discriminatory intestate succession laws, its analysis of the
State's two rationales was exacting. Rather than simply defer to the
State's claimed justifications-which at least one sibling state supreme
court had accepted-this Court examined the State's rationales thor-
oughly, scrutinizing the assumptions underlying the State's arguments,
evaluating the validity of those assumptions, exploring the factual basis
for the State's claims, and probing the link between the State's expla-
nations and its discrimination. After reviewing the State's justifications
for disadvantaging adopted children much more rigorously than it re-
views typical regulatory classifications, this Court concluded, again
applying only the minimum level of scrutiny, that the State's claimed
justifications did not pass constitutional muster.'
102. See Brigham, 166 Vt. at 262 ("[The importance of education to self-government and
the State's duty to ensure its proper dissemination, have been enduring themes in the
political history of Vermont.").
103. Brigham, 166 Vt. at 265.
104. MacCaUum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452, 459 (1996).
105. See MacCallum, 165 Vt. at 459-62.
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In the present case, the State's discrimination does not simply
award one set of persons an advantageous tax status, or regulate some
facets of someone's business. In balancing the State's claimed
justifications against Appellants' interests, this Court must give due
weight to the fact that the State's classification in this case implicates
one of the most profound and personal decisions that a person can
make-to marry the life partner of one's choice. The legal
disadvantages faced by the Appellants and their families are extensive
and substantial. Moreover, the State is not merely drawing lines among
citizens along innocuous lines; this Court must be extremely wary of
State law distinctions among citizens on the bases of sex and sexual
orientation. In short, in order to survive even the minimum level of
scrutiny, the State's justifications for discriminating against Appellants
must be strong, and this Court must carefully analyze the validity of
and factual basis for the various assumptions underlying the State's
arguments.
b. This Court Requires a Real Connec-
tion between the State's Justifications
and Its Discriminatory Classifications
Even if the State identifies a legitimate purpose, it must also es-
tablish that the link, or relationship, between its goal and its
discriminatory classification is reasonable. This Court has not hesitated
to strike down classifications which were not truly reasonably related
to the State's purposes. In the Ludlow Supermarkets case, for example,
this Court insisted that the link between the stated legislative purpose
and the law in question must be scrutinized carefully: "[W]hatever our
duty to give validity and credit to stated legislative purposes, we are
not required to accept as underpinning for any law a purpose that,
through wide-ranging exceptions or other emasculating devices, the
legislature has reduced to a sham or deceit.""'° The Court emphasized
the primacy of "the test of common sense" in evaluating the relation-
ship between a stated end and the means chosen to that end."°7
106. State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 141 Vt. 261, 266 (1982).
107. Ludlow Supermarkets, 141 Vt. at 266. See also Oxx v. Department of Taxes, 159 Vt.
371, 377 (1992) (acknowledging that a state tax provision generally served the State's
end of matching the timing of the tax with the realization of income, but concluding
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In short, a decision to apply the most basic level of review under
the Common Benefits Clause is by no means tantamount to a decision
to uphold the statute in question. In the present case, the State has
drawn significant distinctions between families formed by same-gender
couples and those formed by different gender couples. In order to jus-
tify its refusal to allow these couples equal access to the family
protections that flow from civil marriage, the State must demonstrate
two things: first, it must show a valid public purpose sufficiently
weighty to justify the State's exclusion of an unpopular group from an
extremely important personal choice and human right; second, it must
demonstrate that its exclusion of families formed by same-gender cou-
ples from the protections, supports and obligations of civil marriage is
reasonably related to that purpose.
Appellants respectfully urge that, as in the MacCallum and
Brigham cases,' this Court need not even reach the question of
heightened scrutiny because the State cannot even show that its dis-
crimination is (1) reasonably related to the promotion of (2) a valid
public purpose.' 9 Given the fact that the State cannot overcome even
the minimum level of scrutiny, afortiori the State's classifications can-
not survive heightened scrutiny."0
III. THE STATE'S EXCLUSION OF APPELLANTS FROM CIVIL MAR-
RIAGE IS NOT REASONABLY RELATED TO A VALID PUBLIC
PURPOSE"'
Even applying the minimum level of scrutiny, the State's justifi-
cations for denying Appellants the important right to marry their
that when applied to a federal recapture where the taxpayer had not derived any state
income tax benefit, the law lost its reasonable relation to its purpose).
108. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
109. See infra Section III.
110. For the reasons set forth below, Appellants submit that under existing legal standards
the justifications articulated by the State, on their face and as a matter of logic and
common sense, do not satisfy even the minimum level of scrutiny, let alone the more
stringent review applicable in this case. Even if this Court concluded that the State
could articulate a rationale satisfying the applicable standard, which Appellants sub-
mit the State has not done and cannot do, the State would not be entitled to
dismissal on the pleadings based on the bare record; rather, the State would have the
obligation to then establish the facts, if any, upon which such rationale is predicated.
111. For the purposes of this constitutional analysis, Appellants assume, arguendo, that
Vermont's marriage laws prohibit same-gender couples from marrying.
[Vol. 5:409
FREEDOM TO MARRY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
chosen partners on the basis of questionable classifications like sex and
sexual orientation must be strong and closely linked to its discrimina-
tion. The trial court correctly concluded that nearly all of the State's
claimed justifications were invalid, "difficult to grasp," or "without
common sense or logical basis," but erred in concluding that one of
the State's proffered rationales does survive minimum scrutiny under
the Common Benefits Clause.
112
In evaluating the State's various rationales, this Court should bear
in mind that the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitu-
tion specifically protects "families," as well as individuals, from
statutory classifications that are not reasonably related to a valid public
purpose."' Thus, the Vermont Constitution expressly requires Ver-
mont to share "the fruits of the common enterprise" with diverse
families, and this Court should be particularly wary of rationales
premised on a bald preference for certain families absent sufficient jus-
tification.
For the reasons set forth below, none of the State's claimed justi-
fications for denying the protections, supports and obligations of civil
marriage to Nina and Stacy, Holly and Lois, and Stan and Peter and
their families can survive even the most deferential Common Benefits
Clause analysis."
4
A. The Superior Court Erred in Concluding That
the State's Interest in Promoting the Connection
between Procreation and Child-Rearing Justifies
Its Discrimination
Of all the reasons proffered by the State in support of its dis-
criminatory marriage laws, the only one the trial court concluded
satisfied even the minimum level of review (which the trial court mis-
takenly described as "highly deferential") was the State's asserted
interest in furthering the link between procreation and child rearing.
112. See PC, supra note 5, at 267-70.
113. See VT. CONST., ch. I, art. 7 (1786) ("government is ... instituted for the common
benefit.., of the people .... and not for... any single person, family, or set of per-
sons. . .") (emphasis added).
114. Many of the arguments set forth in response to a specific rationale proffered by the
State apply with equal force to most if not all of the State's claimed justifications and
are hereby incorporated into each of Appellants' responses.
115. See PC, supra note 5, at 267, 270.
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Even if the State could identify a genuinely valid purpose under
the "procreation" umbrella, there is no reasonable connection between
any of the State's conceivable purposes and its discrimination against
Appellants."' Moreover, it is difficult to discern precisely what the
court, or the State, means. If the legitimate purpose underlying the
marriage laws is to ensure a link between procreation and marriage, the
State's purpose is not valid, and its discrimination does not reasonably
relate to its purpose." 7 If the State truly seeks to promote responsible
parenting, two parent families, and maximum support for children,
Appellants respectfully submit that the State's discrimination does not
bear a reasonable relationship to-and, indeed, undermines-that
purpose."8 If the State's goal is to ensure a biological connection be-
tween parents and their children, such a purpose flies in the face of the
legislature's own actions and is not reasonably related to the State's
discrimination." 9 If the State's unspoken assumption is that children
are better off being raised by a father and a mother, the State's as-
sumption is contrary to the virtual consensus among mainstream
mental health professionals."0
1. There is No Logical Link between the
State's Discrimination and Any of
Its Arguable Purposes Relating to
Procreation
At the outset, it must be emphasized that even if the State could
articulate a valid public purpose relating to procreation, the State
would not be able to satisfy the second requirement of the Common
Benefits Clause analysis: demonstrating a reasonable relationship be-
tween the State's purpose and its discrimination against same-gender
couples. To say that different sex marriage is in harmony with the
State's purported purpose is not enough; rather, the State must further
demonstrate that the exclusion of same-gender couples from marriage
promotes the State's purpose. The State cannot establish such a link.
There is simply no basis for the implicit assumption that marriage is a
116. See infra Section IIIA. 1.
117. See infia Section III.A.2.
118. See infra Section III.A.3.
119. See infra Section III.A.4.
120. See infia Section IIIA.5.
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zero-sum game such that allowing same-gender couples to marry will
somehow harm different sex marriages or result in a decrease in the
number of such marriages, particularly those involving procreation or
parenting; nor can the State logically explain how the exclusion of
same-gender couples from the protections of civil marriage helps dif-
ferent sex marriages or results in more such marriages involving
procreation and parenting. Absent any reasonable relationship to the
State's discrimination, any conceivable formulation of the State's
"procreation" explanation fails. Moreover, as set forth below,
"procreation" cannot constitute a truly valid public purpose.
2. Married Couples Do Not Necessarily
Procreate, and Parents Do Not Neces-
sarily Marry
To the extent that the Superior Court and Appellees are suggest-
ing that same-sex couples should not marry because they do not
procreate genetically from their union, that fact is neither a legitimate
basis for, nor reasonably related to, the State's discrimination. In par-
ticular, the State's rationale distorts the connection between marriage
and procreation.
Vermont certainly does not require that married couples be able
to procreate, or even that they be interested in procreating or otherwise
having and raising children. In fact, the United States Supreme Court
has insisted that married couples have a constitutional right not to pro-
create if they do not wish to have children,' and has held that the
ability to "consummate" a marriage through sexual intercourse is not
essential to the fundamental right to marry.122
Vermont allows infertile couples,'2 couples beyond child-bearing
age, couples who do not want to have children, couples who adopt
121. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
122. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding prison inmate's right to marry).
123. The trial court mistakenly relies on outdated Vermont caselaw to suggest that the
ability to procreate is essential to marriage in Vermont. See PC, supra note 5, at 263.
First of all, "physical incapacity" renders a marriage in Vermont voidable, not void.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 512, 515 (1989). Only one of the parties to a mar-
riage, and not the State, may seek to nullify such a marriage. Second, the caselaw
cited by the trial court, and the laws those cases interpret, provide that physical in-
capacity, not inabiliy to procreate, renders a marriage voidable. See VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 512, 515 (1989). The "physical incapacity" statutes protect a partner's
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rather than conceive their own child, and couples who utilize repro-
ductive technologies to marry, as long as they are different sex
couples.' 24 In fact, even if it wished to do so, the State could not con-
stitutionally prohibit any such marriages.
Nor does Vermont prohibit unmarried couples from conceiving
and raising children together. Many parents, including same-gender
couples who cannot marry, are raising children in a committed family
structure outside of the context of a legal marriage, and will continue
to do so regardless of whether they can marry. For example, Nina and
Stacy conceived a child through donor insemination, 25 and Holly and
Lois are raising an adopted teenage daughter. Estimates of the number
of children who are being raised in gay or lesbian families in the
United States range from six million to fourteen million.12
Finally, any attempt to control parenting matters through the
marriage laws penalizes classes of people who are in no way relevant to
the State's stated rationale-namely, same-gender couples who do not
wish to have children, and children of same-sex parents who are denied
protections by laws which forbid their parents from marrying.
3. Discriminatory Marriage Laws Under-
mine the State's Interest in Protecting
Children
Although the State purports to have an abiding interest in chil-
dren, precluding same-gender couples from providing their children
with the protections that flow from legal marriage certainly does not
serve the well-being of those children. Nina and Stacy sought to marry
in part to provide their son with the security that flows from having
legally married parents. The children of parents like Nina and Stacy
would benefit as much as the children of different gender parents from
expectation of physical intimacy, not necessarily procreation. See, e.g., 1 MASSACHU-
sETrs PRACTCE: FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 352 n.1 (1990).
124. Not surprisingly, the United States Census Bureau has confirmed that many married
couples do not have children. See S.ms ROBERTS, WHO AR WE: A PoRTRAIT oF
AMERCA BASED ON THE LAxEST U.S. CENSUS (1993)(in 1990, 26.3% of households
consisted of married couples with children, while 29.8% of households consisted of
married couples without children).
125. Nina gave birth to their son, Noah, and Stacy adopted him as a second parent in June
of 1996.
126. See Charlotte Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD Dav. 1025,
1026 (1992).
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the stability that may flow from having two married parents. Dis-
criminatory marriage laws make no sense unless the State prefers that
children of same-gender parents not enjoy the same measure of security
enjoyed by children of married, different gender parents. Providing the
children of same-gender parents with the protections that would flow
from their parents' marriages can only help those children. The State's
discriminatory marriage laws actually undermine the State's claimed
goal of promoting responsible parenting and two parent families.
4. The State's Emphasis on Biological
Parenting Is Misplaced
If the State's underlying, true goal is to promote responsible par-
enting, two parent families, and maximum support for children, its
emphasis on biological procreation is invalid, inconsistent with the leg-
islature's own actions, and not reasonably related to the State's goals.
There is no logic to the State's implicit suggestion that the well-
considered decisions of many conscientious committed couples,
whether gay or non-gay, to adopt children or conceive children with
the assistance of reproductive technologies are in some way responsible
for the growth of single parent families and widespread social abdica-
tion of parental responsibility.'2 7
The Vermont legislature certainly has never enacted any laws pro-
hibiting adoption or the use of reproductive technologies in order to
preserve "the link between procreation and child-rearing." In fact, in
1993, this Court expressly authorized second parent adoption by the
same-sex partner of a child conceived through donor sperm. 12' The
legislature had an opportunity to and did reconsider this Court's deci-
sion when it recodified the State's adoption laws in 1996. The
127. See State's Motion, supra note 39, at 55; PC, supra note 5, at 61. For an account of
the history of such stigmatization of infertile couples in our society, see ELAINE TYLER
MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND THE PURSurr OF
HAPPINESS (1995). For same-gender couples, as for different gender couples who
have difficulty conceiving a child without medical intervention, the decision to have a
child-whether through adoption or technology-is, by necessity, "a carefully or-
chestrated undertaking, with focused attention to the personal, social, psychological,
ethical and practical considerations." Cheri Pies, Lesbians and the Choice to Parent, 14
MARRIAGE AND FAm. REv., nos. 3/4, 1989, at 137, 139. As a consequence, children
born to such parents, or adopted by such parents, are among the most wanted chil-
dren in the world.
128. See In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368 (1993).
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legislature not only left the B.L. VB. decision in place, it actually codi-
fied the Court's holding, expressly allowing for stepparent adoption by
a parent's unmarried partner, without any limitations with respect to
the sex of the parents.'29
If the legislature had any misgivings about lesbian couples raising
children conceived with donor sperm, terminating the legal relation-
ship between the donor and the child, that would have been the time
and place for the legislature to express its qualms. The legislature did
not do so. Instead, it took steps to help secure the legal relationships
between non-biological lesbian and gay parents and their children. In
light of that fact, any suggestion that the legislature intended to some-
how preserve a biological link between both parents and their children
by preventing same-gender couples from marrying, regardless of
whether they intend to raise children, simply makes no sense.
Furthermore, the relationship between this asserted goal and the
State's refusal to allow same-gender couples to marry is not reasonable.
Same-gender couples are not the only people who cannot conceive
children together. In fact, one in eight married couples in the United
States suffers from infertility, and many of those couples adopt chil-
dren or turn to physicians for help in forming families through
reproductive technologies. "0 The vast majority of couples seeking to
adopt children, or to conceive through reproductive technologies, are
married, different sex couples.' If the State truly wanted to discourage
non-biological parenting, it would prohibit adoption and the use of
reproductive technologies for same-gender and different-gender cou-
ples. It has done neither. This Court should not accept as
underpinning for a law any such purpose that is demonstrated to be a
"sham or deceit."
32
129. SeeVT. STAT. ANN., tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (Supp. 1998).
130. See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 -L4S.TNGS
L.J. 911 (1996); Felicia R. Lee, Infertile Couples Forge Ties Within Society of Their
Own, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 9, 1996, at Al; NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STAT., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEuATH AND HuMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. 87-1990, FECUNDrITy, INFER-
TILITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE H.LTH IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1982) (finding that
34% of American married couples, excluding those who had been surgically steril-
ized, were infertile).
131. See MAY, supra note 127, at 242 (although sperm donor insemination procedures are
now available to single women, "its most common use is among married couples").
132. State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 141 Vt. 261, 266 (1982).
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5. Social Science Research Belies the As-
sumption That Children Are Better
Off in a Home with a Father and a
Mother
As set forth above, there is no reasonable basis for precluding
same-gender couples from marrying on the ground that the State
wishes to promote procreation, responsible parenting, or child-rearing
by biological parents, and there is no connection between the State's
discrimination and the above goals. Moreover, the unspoken but im-
plicit assumption that children are better off when raised by a father
and a mother as opposed to two fathers or two mothers is unsupported
by contemporary social science research.
Numerous researchers in the past two decades have studied the
psychological health, social adjustment, peer relationships, self-esteem,
moral development, personal development, gender-role behavior, and
sexual orientation of children raised in lesbian and gay households.
Summarizing these studies, the American Psychological Association has
concluded:
Not a single study has found children of gay or lesbian par-
ents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to
children of heterosexual parents. Indeed, the evidence to date
suggests that home environments provided by gay and lesbian
parents are as likely as those provided by heterosexual parents
to support and enable children's psychosocial growth.'
133. LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING: A RESOURCE FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS 8 (American Psy-
chol. Ass'n, 1995). To review every pertinent study regarding the children of gay and
lesbian parents would require an entire brief. For examples of recent studies of chil-
dren raised from birth by lesbian couples, see A. Brewaeys et al., Donor Insemination:
Child Development and Family Functioning in Lesbian Mother Families, 12 HUM. RE-
PROD. 1349 (1997) (finding development in lesbian mother families is similar to that
of heterosexual families with regard to psychological, emotional, behavioral and gen-
der role development); Raymond W. Chan et al., Psychosocial Adjustment Among
Children Conceived Via Donor Insemination by Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers, 69
CHILD Dv. 443 (Apr. 1998) ("Our results are consistent with the general hypothesis
that children's well-being is more a function of parenting and relationship processes
within the family... than it is a function of household composition or demographic
factors."); David K. Flaks et al., Lesbians Choosing Motherhood: A Comparative Study
of Lesbian and Heterosexual Parents and Their Children, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PsY-
CHOL. 105, 109 (1995) (finding remarkable imilarity between group of children
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If the State is implying that children raised by two parents of the
same sex experience difficulties regarding issues of gender," 4 research-
ers have debunked the myth that children raised by gay or lesbian
parents have unhealthy or even atypical gender identities or sexual ori-
entations.
35
These findings are not surprising, as studies have consistently
confirmed that the parenting skills of gay and lesbian parents are es-
sentially the same as those of their heterosexual counterparts, and that
the "home environments of lesbian and gay persons [are] as moral and
as physically and psychologically healthy as those of non-gays.
1 6
As a New York court recognized in authorizing a stepparent
adoption by the same-sex partner of a child's natural parent, the secu-
rity and love in a child's home, not the genders of the child's parents,
are what matters:
raised from birth by lesbian couples and matched group of children raised by hetero-
sexual parents with respect to behavioral adjustment); Charlotte J. Patterson,
Children of the Lesbian Baby Boom: BehavioralAdjustment, SelfConcept, and Sex Role
Identity, in LEsBLAN AND GAY PSYCHOL. 156 (Beverly Greene & Gregory M. Herek
eds., 1994) (administering standard psychological tests to parents and children in
lesbian-headed families and finding that the children's social competence and be-
havior matched accepted norms for the general population).
On the basis of such studies a Hawaii trial court rejected the very argument now
proffered by the Attorney General: "[The State of Hawaii] has failed to present suffi-
cient credible evidence which demonstrates that the public interest in the well-being
of children and families, or the optimal development of children would be adversely
affected by same-sex marriage." Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL
694235, (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
134. See State's Motion, supra note 39, at 54; PC, supra note 5, at 60. Appellants note that
the legislature has affirmatively determined that a parent's gender is not even a factor
bearing on a child's best interests. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(c) (1989); see
also infra Section III.C.1.
135. A thorough 1996 literature review of four studies concerning the gender identity,
eight studies concerning the gender-role behavior, and thirteen studies concerning the
sexual orientation of children of gay and lesbian parents concluded that:
Although studies have assessed over 300 offspring of lesbian or gay parents
'in many different samples, no evidence has been found for disturbances in
the development of sexual identity among these individuals. Fears about
difficulties with sexual identity among children of gay and lesbian parents
have not been supported by the results of empirical research.
Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Families with Chil-
dren: Implications of Sodal Science Research for Policy, 52 J. oF Soc. IssuEs, Fall 1996,
at 29, 41.
136. G. Dorsey Green & Frederick W. Bozett, Lesbian Mothers and Gay Fathers, in Ho-
MOS-xuALITY: REsmacH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 197, 211 (John C.
Gonsiorek &James D. Weinrich eds., 1991).
[Vol. 5:409
FREEDOM TO MARRY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
Today a child who receives proper nutrition, adequate
schooling and supportive sustaining shelter is among the
fortunate, whatever the source. A child who also receives the
love and nurture of even a single parent can be counted
among the blessed. Here this Court finds a child who has all
of the above benefits and two adults dedicated to his welfare,
secure in their loving partnership, and determined to raise
him to the very best of their considerable abilities. There is
no reason in law, logic or social philosophy to obstruct such a
favorable situation. 37
B. The Superior Court Correctly Rejected the
State's Claimed Interest in Discouraging Tech-
nologically Assisted Conception As a Justification
for Its Discrimination
As the trial court concluded in this case, "[T]he State's argument
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is rationally re-
lated to minimizing the use of modern fertility treatments in order to
avoid increased child custody and visitation disputes is without any
common sense or logical basis." 3 8
The State's claimed goal of discouraging parents from raising
children to whom they are not biologically linked fails for all of the
reasons set forth above, 139 and the trial court correctly rejected the
claimed link between the use of reproductive technology and litigation
as illogical.4
137. In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (Sur. Ct. 1992), affd, 86 N.Y.2d 651 (1995)
(emphasis added).
138. PC, supra note 5, at 269.
139. See supra Section III.A.
140. See supra Section III.A Moreover, the State's heavy focus on "surrogacy arrange-
ments" is misplaced, given that most such arrangements, like all of the surrogacy cases
cited by the State, involve heterosexual couples. See State's Motion, supra note 39, at
64 n.32; PC, supra note 5, at 70.
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C. The Superior Court Correctly Concluded That
the State's Claimed Interest in Promoting Child-
Rearing in a Setting with Male and Female Role
Models Is Invalid
The State asserted below that children raised by a male and female
parent have the distinct advantage of seeing and experiencing "the in-
nate and unique abilities and characteristics that each sex possesses and
contributes to their combined endeavor." 4' The trial court rightly re-
jected that argument, noting that it was premised on improper
presumptions about the roles of men and women.1
1. The Legislature Has Rejected the
Claim That the Interests of Children
Depend on their Parents' Genders
The Vermont legislature has affirmatively acted to codify this
Court's decision in B.L. VB. to protect the legal relationship between
two same-gender parents and their children,' and has denounced
broad generalizations about the effects on children of living with an
adult of the same or different sex.'44 In the face of this clear expression
of legislative policy, the State cannot infer a legislative intent to penal-
ize families formed by two parents of the same sex.
2. The State's Goal Does Not Reasonably
Relate to Its Discriminatory Laws
Even if the State could credibly claim a legislative policy favoring
parenting by different sex parents, and even if such a policy were con-
stitutionally valid, the State cannot show any reasonable relationship
141. State's Motion, supra note 39, at 54; PC, supra note 5, at 60.
142. See PC, supra note 5, at 268. For a discussion of improper gender role stereotyping,
see infia Section III.D. For a discussion of the psychological research about children
raised by two parents of the same sex, see supra Section IIIA.5.
143. See supra Section IIIA.4.
144. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(c) (1989) (courts should not consider the sex of the
child or the sex of the proposed custodial parent in determining the best interests of
the child); Hubbell v. Hubbell, 8 VT. L Wm 249 (Sept. 19, 1997) (reversing cus-
tody order improperly premised on consideration of parent's and child's gender).
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between its discriminatory marriage laws and that goal. As noted
above, allowing same-gender couples to marry, will not reduce the
number of different gender couples who marry nor the number of
different gender couples who have children. The State's discrimination
against same-gender couples, accordingly, does not reasonably relate to
its claimed purpose.
Moreover, dozens, if not hundreds, of same-gender couples in this
State are currently raising children together. Allowing these couples to
marry would not decrease their children's access to role models of both
genders, and prohibiting a child's same-gender parents from marrying
one another does not increase that child's access to role models of both
genders. In fact, declining to allow a child's same-sex parents to marry
only burdens rather than benefits that child.
D. The Superior Court Correctly Rejected the
State's Claimed Goal of Bridging Gaps between
Women and Men
The trial court rightly concluded that the State's proclaimed in-
terest in uniting men and women to "bridge their differences" is
invalid insofar as it is "clearly premised upon improper presumptions
about the roles of men and women." 4 ' Moreover, even if the State's
goal were valid, the State's exclusion of families headed by same-sex
couples from civil marriage is not reasonably related to its goal. In
short, ending discrimination against same-gender couples would take
nothing away from different sex marriages or the values on which they
are premised.
1. The State's Purpose Is Not Valid Be-
cause It Is Premised on Improper
Presumptions about the Roles of
Women and Men
The State has attempted to justify its discrimination by concluso-
rily asserting that men and women (apparently without exception)
bring different (albeit unidentified) qualities to the institution of
145. PC, supra note 5, at 268.
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marriage.4'4 Few things are more clearly intolerable under both the
Vermont and federal Constitutions than broad-brush generalizations
about the differing qualities or characteristics of the sexes codified into
law.
As United States Supreme Court Justice Ginsberg has recently
noted, "State actors controlling gates to opportunity ... may not ex-
clude qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles
and abilities of males and females."" 47 The Court recoiled at a state
classification based on "overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capicities, or preferences of males and females."' 48 Such gener-
alizations about the "essential natures" and characteristics of men and
women have, in the past, been invoked to justify the exclusion of
women from a wide variety of vocations, ranging from the practice of
law and medicine to careers in policing."' As Justice Ginsburg ex-
plained, "'Inherent differences' between men and women, we have
come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigra-
tion of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual's opportunity."5
Notwithstanding this clear constitutional mandate-one which
Appellants submit this Court should embrace in applying Vermont's
Constitution-and notwithstanding the Vermont legislature's consci-
entious efforts through recent decades to eliminate state-sponsored
discrimination between the sexes,' 5' the State has now asserted in this
case that men and women are essentially different. The State contends
that these differences, which are not simply physical, but also psycho-
logical and cultural, create a chasm that must be bridged by civil
marriage. 52 (Perhaps wisely, Appellees have not ventured to delineate
146. See State's Motion, supra note 39, at 53; PC, supra note 5, at 59.
147. United States v. Virginia ("VMI'), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2280 (1996) (quoting Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)) (invalidating Virginia
Military Institute's men-only policy).
148. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
149. SeeVMI, 116 S. Cr. at 2280-81.
150. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 (emphasis added).
151. See, e.g.,'VT. CONST., Ch. II, § 76 (amending constitution to substitute gender-
neutral terms).
152. The State's reference to supposed inherent differences between the sexes to justify
marriage laws prohibiting intra-sex marriage hearkens back to a prior era's reliance on
claimed inherent differences between the races to justify laws prohibiting interracial
marriage: "The color line is evidence of an attempt, based on instinctive choice, to
preserve those distinctive values which a racial group has come to regard as of the
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what those differences might be, and which qualities and contributions
men bring to marriage, and which women bring.) Such a purpose,
premised on undefined, antiquated generalizations about the essential
natures of the respective sexes, cannot be valid.15
2. The State's Discrimination Is Not Rea-
sonably Related to the State's Claimed
Goal of Uniting Men and Women
Once again, the State's claimed goal, even if it were valid, is logi-
cally disconnected from its discrimination. To say that different sex
marriage is in harmony with the State's purpose does not in and of
itself answer the constitutional question; rather, the State must explain
how its exclusion of same-gender couples from the myriad protections
of marriage reasonably promotes its goal of encouraging heterosexual
marriages. The State cannot do so. Appellants' marriages would take
nothing away from different sex marriages, but would simply provide
for their own families the same legal protections and obligations en-
joyed by other families in the State of Vermont.
3. The State's Discrimination Does Not
Reasonably Relate to the Goal of
Bridging Differences and Working
Together
To the extent that the State truly wants to help people "bridge dif-
ferences" and work together, the exclusion of Appellants from marriage
highest moment to itself." Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 44 (Cal. 1948) (Shenk, J.,
dissenting) (arguing in favor of preservation of ban on interracial marriage).
153. This argument also reflects the sex discrimination built into the State's prescription of
the genders of marital partners, and demonstrates that the State's sex-based restriction
on marital choice reinforces sexism and furthers sex discrimination. See infra Section
IVA.
Moreover, the State has singled out one axis of differences-presumed gender
differences-and designated it as the paramount divide in our society. If, as the State
argues, its goal is to "bridge differences" between people and encourage "working to-
gether," State's Motion, supra note 39, at 53; PC, supra note 5, at 59, why not
authorize marriages only between rich and poor, or only between persons of different
races? The State cannot merely rely on claimed differences between men and women
to justify its discrimination; it must explain why those differences are constitutionally
material.
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does not reasonably relate to that interest. Ending discrimination
against same-gender couples will not sway-let alone burn-any
bridges between men and women. To the contrary, marriage is another
way to strengthen the bridges lesbian and gay Vermonters build with
each other to the detriment of no one.
Like their non-gay counterparts, lesbian and gay Vermonters
contribute to Vermont's businesses, civic organizations, schools and
religious groups. 51 Moreover, lesbian and gay Vermonters frequently
form relationships, with and without children, comparable in every
way to their non-gay neighbors."'.
Individuals in such same-gender couples, like their different sex
counterparts, often celebrate and bridge a variety of deeply ingrained
differences between self and other-differences in outlook, taste, val-
ues, class, race, education, religion and background, to name but a few.
If the institution of marriage serves an important unitive purpose,
benefitting not just those who marry, but society as a whole, then cer-
tainly individuals and society are best served by recognition of long-
term committed partnerships-and legal support of "bridges"-
regardless of the sex or sexual orientation of the individual partners.
E. The Superior Court Rightly Rejected the State's
Assertion That Allowing Appellants to Marry
Will Fundamentally Change and Destabilize the
Institution of Marriage
The trial court correctly concluded that "the State's interest in
preserving the institution of marriage for no other reason than to pre-
serve a time honored institution is invalid."'56 As the trial court
explained, "A bare desire to preserve tradition and resist change is not a
valid public purpose." 57
154. See ESMKDGE, SAME-SEX MARtIAGE, supra note 49, at 8.
155. See Lawrence A. Kurdek, Relationship Outcomes and Their Predictors: Longitudinal
Evidence from Heterosexual Married, Gay Cohabitin, and Lesbian Cohabiting Couples,
60 J. MAMAGE & FAm. 253 (1998) (finding that gay, lesbian, and heterosexual mar-
ried couples enjoyed similar levels of love and relationship satisfaction, and similar
rate of change in relationship quality over five-year study period).
156. PC, supra note 5, at 268.
157. PC, supra note 5, at 268.
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1. Avoiding Change, Per Se, Is Not a
Valid Purpose
The State makes the circular argument that the protections and
obligations of civil marriage should be limited to heterosexual marriage
because they always have been so limited. While a history of discrimina-
tion against same-gender couples may explain the exclusionary nature
of the marriage laws, it does not justify such exclusion. Otherwise the
State could always argue that the status quo is, by definition, constitu-
tionally permissible. The State may not simply assert and rely upon a
purported tradition of discrimination; rather, it must explain how ad-
hering to the perceived tradition benefits the public. As United States
Supreme Court Justice Holmes wrote, more than 100 years ago:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.'58
Constitutional requirements of equality, by design, often mandate
a departure from tradition rather than an adherence thereto. As one
commentator has explained, with reference to the federal constitution:
The Equal Protection Clause ... has been understood as an
attempt to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory
practices, however deeply ingrained and longstanding ...
[T]he Equal Protection Clause looks forward, serving to in-
validate practices that were widespread at the time of its
ratification and that were expected to endure. "
For these reasons, the State cannot merely assert a tradition of man-
woman marriage in defense of its marriage laws: it must justify con-
tinuation of that tradition.
158. O.W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARv. L REv. 457,469 (1897).
159. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1161, 1163 (1988)
(emphasis added); see alo MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452, 460 (1996)
("Equal treatment issues are often exacerbated by the passage of time.").
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Spurred by evolving notions of justice, our society's concept of
what constitutes a "marriage" has changed in many respects since the
nation's inception. For instance, when the Fourteenth Amendment
was passed by Congress in 1868, most states prohibited marriages be-
tween persons of different races.' For many years thereafter, the
courts upheld race based restrictions in marriage. In 1948, when Cali-
fornia became the first state to invalidate state law prohibitions of
interracial marriage, 61 thirty of the forty-eight states still prohibited
interracial marriage.
62
Despite this overwhelming tradition of race discrimination in
marriage, Vermont, at every stage of its history, allowed interracial
marriage. Moreover, as society's understanding of equality evolved,
courts in other states recognized that the longstanding practice of pro-
hibiting interracial marriage was odious, and in 1967 the United States
Supreme Court oudawed such prohibitions altogether.'63 The Court in
Loving v. Virginia refused to embrace the view that interracial mar-
riages could be prohibited because they were inconsistent with the
common understanding of marriage,'" and denounced the state's dis-
criminatory marriage laws as "odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. ' Recognizing
that marriage is a "basic civil right," which is "fundamental to our very
existence," the Court concluded, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that ... the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State. " 16
160. See Edward G. Spitko, Notes: A Critique ofJustice Antonin Scalia's Approach to Fun-
damentalightsAdjudiation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1337, 1357 & n.109.
161. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948). At the time Perez was decided,
and for many years thereafter, the concept of interracial marriage was genuinely hor-
rifying-and antithetical to the very definition of marriage-to many people. See Eric
Zorn, Marriage Issue Just as Plain as Black and White, CHI. TPam., May 19, 1996, § 4,
at 1 (noting similarity of arguments against interracial marriage by state legislators
from 1823 to 1964 to contemporary arguments against marriages of same-sex cou-
ples).
162. See Perez; 198 P.2d at 38 (Shenk, J., dissenting). See generally, James Trosino, Note,
American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L.
Rvv. 93 (1993).
163. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
164. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
165. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted).
166. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The recognition of interracial marriage is by no means the
only historical change in American family patterns. "Over the past 300 years, Ameri-
can families have undergone a series of far-reaching revolutions that profoundly
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just as our nation has come to condemn discrimination based on
race, so too does it increasingly condemn discrimination based on sex
and sexual orientation. In Baehr v. Lewin, 67 the Hawaii Supreme
Court recognized that this evolution is ongoing, and applied its state
equal protection principles and Loving to reject the State of Hawaii's
attempts to maintain sex discrimination within marriage:
Analogously to [the State's] argument... the Virginia courts
declared that interracial marriage simply could not exist be-
cause the Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically
unnatural, 388 U.S. at 3, 87 S.Ct. at 1819, and, in effect, be-
cause it had theretofore never been the "custom" of the state
to recognize mixed marriages, marriage "always" having been
construed to presuppose a different configuration. With all
due respect to the Virginia courts of a bygone era, we do not
believe that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the
subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates,
constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs
change with an evolving social order.1
6
1
In short, as the trial court recognized, a bare desire to resist
change, in and of itself, is not a "valid public purpose. " "'
altered their family life...." Mnrz & KELLOGG, supra note 48, at xiv. "Despite
nearly four centuries of fears that the family is decaying the institution has, of course,
survived." Minrz & KEL.oG, supra note 48, at xx.
167. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
168. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
169. Nor is there any basis for the State's suggestion that legally recognizing Appellants'
deep and abiding mutual commitments would somehow destabilize the institution of
marriage. See State's Motion, supra note 39, at 56; PC, supra note 5, at 62.
Allowing same-gender couples to legally marry will not cause any heterosexual
couples to dissolve their marriages, but will only increase the number of Vermonters
in legally recognized, committed unions. United States Supreme Court Justice Gins-
berg has debunked the suggestion that more inclusive policies somehow damage,
rather than strengthen, longstanding institutions:
A prime part of the history of our Constitution ... is the story of the ex-
tension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or
excluded.... There is no reason to believe that the admission of women
capable of all the activities required of [Virginia Military Institute] cadets
would destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity to serve the
"more perfect Union."
United States v. Virginia ("VMI"), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2287 (1996) (citation omitted).
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2. The "Change" Appellants Urge Is Not
Unique to Vermont or the United
States
Legal recognition of same-sex relationships is developing concur-
rently around the world. The Netherlands, Denmark, Greenland,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden offer same-sex couples all of the
rights of legal marriage except for certain protections relating to chil-
dren and church weddings.'70 Moreover, in 1996, pursuant to a
mandate of the constitutional court, Hungary legalized common law
marriage between partners of the same sex.' In short, legal recogni-
tion of marriages between same-gender partners would not be as
unprecedented as Appellees suggest.
F. The Superior Court Correctly Rejected the
State's Supposed Normative Statement As Justifi-
cation for Its Discrimination
The State claimed below that the legislature has excluded families
formed by same-gender couples from civil marriage and its concomi-
tant protections and obligations in order to make a "normative
statement" or to reflect a "value judgment." 72 As the trial court aptly
noted in rejecting that argument, the State has neglected to explain
exactly what those normative statements and value judgments are.'"
170. See E.J. Graft The Inevitability ofSame Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 1998,
at A27.
Vermont already allows a person to adopt his or her same-gender partner's chil-
dren, and religious and civil marriages are distinct in Vermont, so the few limitations
that these countries do place on full marriage rights for same-gender couples are in-
apposite.
171. See Graft supra note 170, at A27. Moreover, recently published historical materials
demonstrate that marriages, or marriage-like relationships, have been recognized and
supported between people of the same gender throughout human history. See also
ESR IDGE, SAmE-SEx MARRiAGE, supra note 49, ch. 2.; William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
History ofSame-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L Rpv. 1419 (1993).
172. State's Motion, supra note 39, at 59; PC, supra note 5, at 65.
173. See PC, supra note 5, at 268.
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1. The Claimed "Normative Statement"
Reflects Illegitimate Community
Prejudice
This Court has insisted that acquiescing to and reflecting a com-
munity prejudice is not a valid public purpose. In fact, in MacCallum
this Court declared: "The Constitution cannot control [private] preju-
dices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect."174 The United States Supreme Court has similarly held that
mere animus toward a class of people-in fact, toward gays and lesbi-
ans--does not give rise to a legitimate public purpose. 17' In the Romer
case the Court considered a Colorado constitutional amendment
which barred the enactment of state or local antidiscrimination laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Unper-
suaded by the ostensibly legitimate interests in the amendment claimed
by the State of Colorado, the Court remarked on "the inevitable infer-
ence that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected."' 76 The Court responded: "[I]f the constitu-
tional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare.., desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est.)' 77 Applying that principle to the case before it, the Court
concluded that the amendment made gay and lesbian people "unequal
to everyone else" and prohibited the State of Colorado from "so
deem[ing] a class of persons a stranger to its laws.'
78
Like the statutory classification in Romer, the State's prohibition
of marriages between partners of the same gender places a huge array
of legal protections beyond the reach of gay and lesbian Vermonters
and their families. The State cannot and does not justify the disabilities
with reference to some broad, collective community purpose but,
174. See MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452, 459 (1996) (quoting Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
175. See Romerv. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
176. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
177. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
178. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
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rather, essentially relies on community prejudice against gays and les-
bians and their families in support of its discrimination.'79
The State would, no doubt, deny that its claimed "normative
statement" is merely an expression of community prejudice. However,
one need merely review but a few sentences from the Virginia trial
court's decision banishing the interracial couple of Richard and Mil-
dred Loving from the Commonwealth of Virginia for having the
audacity to legally marry one another (in another jurisdiction) to ap-
preciate the pitfalls of a state's imbuing its own perceived collective
morality (or at least majoritarian view of morality) with the power and
authority of the law:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but
for the interference with his arrangement there would be no
cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.18
This Court should be wary of ever upholding drastic restrictions
on individual liberty, or far-reaching discrimination against entire
classes of individuals and families, solely on the basis of the State's as-
serted morality, absent any showing that the State's claimed normative
* vision in fact promotes the common good.'' As the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has explained,
Many issues that are considered to be matters of morals are
subject to debate, and no sufficient state interest justifies leg-
islation of norms simply because a particular belief is
followed by a number of people, or even a majority. Indeed,
what is considered to be "moral" changes with the times and
is dependent upon societal background. Spiritual leadership,
179. The State's reliance on the legislature's supposed disapproval of gay and lesbian Ver-
monters is also difficult to square with the legislature's efforts to eradicate private
discrimination against gay and lesbian Vermonters and their families. See supra note
63.
180. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting from trial judge's ruling).
181. The State's "normative statement" rationale may prove far too much. If the State can
prohibit a person from marrying the partner of his or her choice on the basis of sex or
sexual orientation in order to make a "normative statement," then the State could
presumably invoke similar value judgments to prohibit a wide range of marriages, in-
cluding, for example, second marriages by divorced people.
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not the government, has the responsibility for striving to im-
prove the morality of individuals.
1 2
This State, too, should avoid legislating or enshrining in its con-
stitutional jurisprudence a discriminatory brand of morality. It must
also avoid discrimination premised on (unstated) baseless myths and
stereotypes. Although it knows nothing about them personally, the
State has concluded on the basis of their sex and sexual orientation that
these Appellants, and other same-gender couples, are not worthy of the
protections, supports and obligations of marriage. The Vermont Con-
stitution does not allow the State to codify community prejudice in
that way.
2. The Bare Desire to Promote One Part
of the Community over Another Is
Not a Valid State Purpose
Even if the State's admitted desire to favor heterosexual relation-
ships and families, or to disfavor gay and lesbian relationships and
families, could be described as something other than reflecting a com-
munity prejudice or animus, the State's goal would still be
impermissible. This Court has clearly determined that the State's de-
sire to benefit a particular class, or disadvantage a particular group, is
not a valid public purpose:
[T]his objective of favoring one part of the community over
another is totally irreconcilable with the Vermont Constitu-
tion. It is the very kind of benefit prohibited as an improper
purpose by Chapter I, Article 7. The purpose of the prefer-
ential legislation must be to further a goal independent of the
preference awarded, sufficient to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.18
In Ludlow Supermarkets, this Court struck down a law designed to
benefit small businesses to the detriment of large businesses
182. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (1980) (striking down state law pro-
hibiting sex outside of marriage).
183. State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 141 Vt. 261,269 (1982).
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notwithstanding the State's argument that small business enterprises
were "essential and fundamental to the economy of the State."
84
In this case, like the Ludlow Supermarkets case, the State's justifi-
cation for its discriminatory laws reflects, on its face, a preference for
one segment of the community over another, without any goal inde-
pendent of the preference awarded. That is, the State prefers families
formed by a (heterosexual) man and woman over families formed by
two (gay) men or two (lesbian) women, and thus deliberately seeks to
advantage the first group and disadvantage the latter two. Such a bare
desire to promote and protect families formed by heterosexual couples,
or to hinder families formed by gay and lesbian Vermonters, cannot
justify the immense disability the State has imposed on the Appellants.
3. The State's Goal Is Not Reasonably
Related to Its Chosen Means
As the trial court pointed out, the State has not even attempted to
explain the moral vision it claims underlies the vast disparity in legal
protections the State is willing to provide families formed by different
gender versus same-gender couples. Accordingly, it is difficult to evalu-
ate the connection between the goal and its chosen means even
assuming, arguendo, the validity of the State's goal.
If the State's goal is to prevent or deter same-gender couples from
forming families together because of the State's claimed normative pref-
erence for heterosexuality, it is difficult to see how withholding the
protections and obligations of civil marriage will accomplish that goal.
Nor is there any reason to believe that barring lesbian women and gay
men from marrying the partner of their choice will drive them into dif-
ferent sex marriages, let alone happy or productive heterosexual unions.
G. The Superior Court Correctly Rejected the
State's Claimed Interest in Ensuring Interstate
Recognition of Its Marriages
The trial court rightly recognized that the State's claimed interest
in "preserving marriage in a form recognized by all other states,"'8
184. Ludlow Supermarkets, 141 Vt. at 269.
185. State's Motion, supra note 39, at 57; PC, supra note 5, at 63.
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"doesn't appear to even approach a valid purpose."'86 As the trial court
explained,
The State of Vermont does not need the consent of all the
other states to guarantee rights ensured by its own Constitu-
tion. Vermont has historically licensed marriages which were
or are not uniformly licensed by other states.[lr 7] Speculation
about possible discrimination should not be used to justify
discrimination against same-sex couples in Vermont now.
188
If maintaining sex and sexual orientation discrimination could be
justified by the supposed interest in protecting same-sex Vermont cou-
ples who would marry here from discrimination in other states,
Vermont could not guarantee rights ensured by its own Constitution
unless other states consented to its doing so. Accepting this speculative
proposition would both reduce Vermont's constitutional guarantees to
the lowest common denominator of acceptability among the states,
and render Vermont an accomplice to the (hypothetical) prejudice of
others.
IV. THE STATE'S JUSTIFICATIONS ALSO FAIL TO SATISFY THE
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY ACCORDED TO LAWS WHICH DIs-
CRIMINATE BASED- ON SEX AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
WHICH BURDEN THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY
For the reasons set forth above, the State cannot demonstrate a
valid public purpose which is reasonably related to the State's pro-
hibiting Stacy and Nina, Stan and Peter, and Holly and Lois from
marrying one another. A fortiori, the discriminatory marriage laws
cannot survive the heightened scrutiny applicable to classifications
186. PC, supra note 5, at 268.
187. For example, during the period of time in our history when the vast majority of states
in this country forbade marriages between couples of different races, see Perez v. Lip-
pold, 198 P.2d 17, 38 (Cal. 1948), Vermont was one of a minority of states which
never imposed such a restriction on interracial couples. Similarly, Vermont permits
first cousin marriages, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1-3 (1989), which many states
prohibit. See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HAnv. L.
Rav. at 1264; see also In re B.LV.B., 160 Vt. 368 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A,
§ 1-102(b) (1989) (allowing adoption by same-sex partner of parent even though
most states have yet to grant such adoptions).
188. PC, supra note 5, at 268.
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which are premised on suspect bases, burden fundamental rights, or
both.
A. Precluding Same-Gender Couples from Marrying
Impermissibly Discriminates on the Suspect Basis
of Sex
Likely due to the fact that this Court has historically subjected
state classifications--even those subject only to the most deferential
review-to meaningful scrutiniy, this Court has never actually analyzed
any credible "suspect class" claim, and thus has never provided any
guidance about what types of classifications are suspect. 9 Appellants
submit that the legislative classifications at issue in this case, prevent-
ing a woman from marrying her chosen life partner if her chosen life
partner is also a woman, and preventing a man from marrying his cho-
sen life partner if his chosen life partner is also a man, effect state
discrimination on the basis of two related suspect categories: gender
and sexual orientation. Because the State's marriage laws must satisfy
"a more searching scrutiny," they fail because they are not narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling state interest.'"
1. Classifications Based on Gender Are
Subject to Heightened Scrutiny
Although this Court has never expressly held that gender-based
classifications are suspect,'9' and thus subject to heightened scrutiny
under the Common Benefits Clause, it has given every indication that
if required to reach the question, it would concur with the trial court's
conclusion that gender-based classifications are subject to heightened
scrutiny.' 92 First, in applying the Common Benefits Clause, the Court
has frequently drawn guidance from the United States Supreme
189. See, e.g., MacCallum v. Seymour's Adm'r, 165 Vt. 452, 457 n.1 (1996) (declining to
consider whether classifications of adopted children are suspect because case was re-
solved under minimum scrutiny).
190. See Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 265 (1997). With respect to the scrutiny applica-
ble to sexual-orientation discrimination, see infra Section IV.B.
191. See State v. George, 157 Vt. 580, 588 (1991) (declining to reach the issue).
192. See PC, supra note 5, at 265-66.
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Court's application of the federal Equal Protection Clause. 93 The
United States Supreme Court has clearly and repeatedly insisted that
"[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action."'94
In particular, the party seeking to uphold government action based on
gender must show "'at least that the classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' "195
This Court has long emphasized that the Vermont Constitution
may afford greater civil rights protections than the United States
Constitution."6 The trial court in this case correctly concluded that "it
would be anomalous if the Vermont Constitution did not subject
gender-based distinctions to scrutiny as searching as that required
under the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."1
97
By the same token, many sibling states subject gender-based clas-
sifications to strict scrutiny. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court
has concluded:
[W]e find that classification of one's personal privileges and
immunities by one's gender is at least as old as by race, and as
much based on unexamined societal stereotypes and preju-
dices.... Accordingly, we hold that when classifications are
made on the basis of gender, they are, like racial, alienage,
and nationality classifications, inherently suspect.'98
193. See, e.g., Brigham, 166 Vt. at 265.
194. United States v. Virginia ("VMI"), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) (quotations omit-
ted).
195. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2271 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982)).
196. See, e.g., Hodgeman v. Jard Co., 157 Vt. 461, 464 (1991) ("Defendant is correct that
the Vermont Constitution is freestanding and may require this Court to examine
more closely distinctions drawn by state government than would the Fourteenth
Amendment."); State v. Morris, 165 Vt. 111 (1996) (search and seizure of opaque
trash bag, permissible under federal Constitution, violates Vermont Constitution).
197. PC, supra note 5, at 266.
198. Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 653 P.2d 970, 977-78 (Or. 1982) (considering
worker's compensation benefits to female dependents of male workers, but not to
comparable male dependents of female workers); see also Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d
882 (Wash. 1975) (noting that even before passage of state equal rights amendment,
classifications based on sex were subject to strict scrutiny).
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Moreover, this Court has in the past suggested that gender-based
classifications are analogous to race-based distinctions for constitu-
tional purposes. In the case of State v. Jenne,' this Court considered a
criminal defendant's claim that a county's method of selecting a jury
pool produced juries that did not represent a fair cross section of the
population. In its discussion, this Court quoted approvingly from a
United States Supreme Court decision expressly distinguishing be-
tween non-distinctive groups, such as blue-collar workers and less-well-
educated individuals, and "special groups, like women and blacks, that
have been subjected to discrimination and prejudice within the com-
munity.,
200
Given Vermont's historic position as a protector of civil rights,
and the persuasive authority from sibling state courts and the United
States Supreme Court, Appellants respectfully submit that the Com-
mon Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution requires that
gender-based classifications be subjected to heightened scrutiny.
2. Vermont's Marriage Laws, As Inter-
preted by the Trial Court, Contain
Gender-Based Classifications
Vermont's marriage laws, as interpreted by the trial court, contain
explicit, facial gender-based classifications. Stan Baker was denied a
license to marry Peter Harrigan because both are men. Nina Beck
would undoubtedly be able to marry Stacy Jolles if Stacy were a man.
If Holly Puterbaugh were a man, she would unquestionably be allowed
to marry Lois Farnham. The legislative classifications that prevent each
of these committed couples from accessing the right to marry are, on
their face, based on gender.
The trial court has attempted to evade the obvious gender-based
discrimination built into the marriage laws by arguing that the prohi-
bition of marriage between partners of the same gender flows
inevitably from the very definition of marriage. '0 As the Hawaii Su-
preme Court observed in Baehr v. Lewin, such an argument is "circular
and unpersuasive." 22 Looking to historic definitions of marriage, the
199. State v. Jenne, 156 Vt. 283 (1991).
200. Jenne, 156 Vt. at 291.
201. See PC, supra note 5, at 266.
202. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993).
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trial court in this case has concluded that because same-sex couples
were not historically allowed to marry, then by definition, marriage is
restricted only to different gender couples. But the very issue in this
case is not how "marriage" has historically been defined; rather, the
issue is whether the prohibition of marriage between partners of the
same gender is discriminatory and, if so, whether it is constitutionally
permissible.
By way of analogy, in the case of Loving v. Virginia, the trial court
had concluded that Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws were not uncon-
stitutional because interracial marriage was, by definition, not a true
marriage.20 That circular reasoning in support of the prohibition of
mixed-race marriage parallels the specious reasoning the trial court
here used to justify sex discrimination in marriage laws.
The United States Supreme Court rejected such reasoning in its
Loving decision, and the Hawaii Supreme Court, recognizing the anal-
ogy, similarly rejected the assertion that Hawaii's marriage laws were
not discriminatory because marriage, by definition, requires one man
and one woman:
The facts in Loving and the respective reasoning of the Vir-
ginia courts, on the one hand, and the United States Supreme
Court, on the other, both ... unmask the tautological and
circular nature of [the state of Hawaii's] argument that
[Hawaii's prohibition of same-gender marriage] does not im-
plicate [the equal rights provision] of the Hawaii




The Hawaii Supreme Court further dismissed such reasoning as an
exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry. 20 1
By the same token, a trial court in Alaska recently rejected the
claim that because the sex discrimination in Alaska's marriage laws
flowed from the historical definition of marriage, those laws did not
trigger constitutional concerns:
It is not enough to say that "marriage is marriage" and accept
without any scrutiny the law before the court. It is the duty
203. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
204. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
205. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
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of the court to do more than merely assume that marriage is
only, and must only be, what most are familiar with. In some
parts of our nation mere acceptance of the familiar would
have left segregation in place.... [T]his court cannot defer
to the legislature or familiar notions when addressing this is-
206
sue.
In addition to the facial gender discrimination reflected in the
trial court's interpretation of the marriage laws, those laws also reflect
more subde but nonetheless invidious gender bias. The State's own
rationale for its discriminatory marriage laws is premised on the un-
supported, broad assertion that men and women each possess
unspecified inherent and distinct characteristics such that only male-
female relationships can be truly worthy of the protections and sup-
ports that marriage provides. 2 7 At its core, the State has argued,
marriage is defined by gender differences.
It is impossible to square the trial court's recognition that the
above rationale in support of discriminatory marriage laws is "clearly
premised upon improper presumptions about the roles of men and
women,""' with the trial court's conclusion that the discrimination
built into the marriage laws is not based on gender but, rather, flows
from the definition of marriage itself."
As noted above, the State cannot satisfy even the minimum level
of scrutiny, let alone the heightened scrutiny applicable to laws which
discriminate on the basis of sex.
206. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 at 2
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (right to marry chosen partner, including same-sex
partner, is fundamental right).
207. See State's Motion, supra note 39, at 45-47, 53; PC, supra note 5, at 51-53, 59.
208. PC, supra note 5, at 268.
209. See PC, supra note 5, at 266.
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B. Precluding Same-Gender Couples from Marrying
Impermissibly Discriminates on the Suspect Basis
of Sexual Orientation
1. Vermont's Marriage Laws, As Inter-
preted by the Trial Court, Classify on
the Basis of Sexual Orientation
Closely related to the sex discrimination built into the marriage
statutes, as interpreted by the trial court, is the discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation which those statutes embody. By prohibiting
a man from marrying a man, and a woman from marrying a woman,
the State is essentially barring all gay and lesbian couples-couples
formed by two men or by two women-from marrying. In so doing,
the State of Vermont is unquestionably discriminating against gay and
lesbian families and persons.
The State attempts to sidestep that reality, noting that gay men
and lesbian women can marry in Vermont (as long as they marry
someone of the proper sex). The State seems to want it both ways. In
its attempt to deny that it discriminates on the basis of gender, the
State claims that its marriage laws are not based on distinctions be-
tween men and women but, rather, are based on distinctions between
men and women who want to marry a person of the same sex (that is,
those who seek recognition of their committed gay or lesbian relation-
ships) and men and women who want to marry a person of a different
sex (that is, those seeking legal recognition of their committed hetero-
sexual relationships).21 ' Then, in its attempt to deny that it
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, the State suggests that
its laws do not prohibit gay and lesbian Vermonters from marrying,
but simply require that they marry someone of the proper sex.211 The
reality is, the State's restrictions impermissibly discriminate on the ba-
sis of sex and sexual orientation. 2
210. See State's Motion, supra note 39, at 40-41; PC, supra note 5, at 46-47.
211. See State's Motion, supra note 39, at 37-38; PC, supra note 5, at 43-44.
212. In arguing that gay and lesbian Vermonters are free to marry, as long as they many
someone of the "right" sex, the State fails to acknowledge that the essence of the mar-
riage right is the right to marry the partner of one's choice. To a gay man or a lesbian
woman, the right to marry only a partner of the opposite sex is no right at all.
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2. Classifications Based on Sexual Ori-
entation Are Subject to Heightened
Scrutiny
This Court has never considered whether sexual orientation (or
any other classification) is a suspect basis for distinguishing among
Vermonters under the Common Benefits Clause. Appellants respect-
fully submit that classifications which are irrelevant to any proper
legislative goal, and classifications excluding individuals or groups who
have historically been subjected to discrimination, are subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Common Benefits Clause.
With respect to the first factor, other courts have recognized the
constitutional pitfalls in laws which exclude a group defined by a char-
acteristic that bears no relation to the ability to perform or contribute
213to society.
Gay and lesbian individuals enrich every aspect of society to the
same extent as their heterosexual counterparts. In particular, like oth-
ers in our society, gay men and lesbian women, including the
Appellants in this case, form committed, long-term, and often lifetime
relationships. Many lesbian and gay couples raise children together,
and gay and lesbian families are woven into the rich fabric of our
communities.
Any law which purports to distinguish gay and lesbian families
from other families on the basis of generalizations about the ability of
gay and lesbian persons to form, nurture, and maintain cohesive fami-
lies that serve the same functions in our society as other families is as
flawed as those laws excluding women from valuable educational op-
portunities on the basis of women's claimed inferiority, and should be
subjected to heightened scrutiny.
213. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia ("VMI"), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2280-81 (1996)
(noting that ability to withstand rigors of higher education or professional practice
does not vary by sex); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) ("Classifications
treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal."); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (condemning discrimination which bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society); Able v. United States, 968 F.
Supp. 850, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that classifications on the basis of sexual
orientation are suspect, and noting that a court should consider "whether the trait
which defines the group 'frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society").
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With respect to the second factor, the State has conceded,2 4 and
the trial court concurred,1 5 that gay and lesbian citizens have been the
subject of historical discrimination. 2 6
In light of this history, United States Supreme Court Justice
Brennan recognized that discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion should be subjected to strict, or at least heightened, scrutiny:
[H]omosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority
of this country's population. Because of the immediate and
severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals
once so identified publicly, members of this group are par-
ticularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the
political arena. Moreover, homosexuals have historically been
the object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair
to say that discrimination against homosexuals is "likely ...
to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than... rationality."
217
Nowhere are society's historical stereotypes of and prejudices
against gays and lesbians more apparent than with respect to their re-
lationships. The existence of this case in itself demonstrates that fact.
Many people who are comfortable supporting the civil rights of gay
and lesbian individuals do not recognize that present laws relating to
marriage deprive gay and lesbian individuals of fundamental civil rights
in connection with (for many) the most important sphere of their
lives: their relationships with their life partners.
For the above reasons, the State's exclusion of Appellants from the
advantages and responsibilities of legal marriage should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny and stricken.
214. See State's Motion, supra note 39, at 35; PC, supra note 5, at 41.
215. See PC, supra note 5, at 264.
216. See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 854-55 (recounting a long history of official and private
discrimination against gay men and lesbian women, from laws in the Middle Ages
imposing death by burning on homosexual men, to extermination in Nazi concentra-
tion camps in the 20th century, to widespread hate-based violence and job
discrimination in modern times).
217. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, along with Justice Marshall, from denial of writ of certiorari in case in-
volving school guidance counselor suspended due to her bisexuality) (quoting Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)) (citation omitted).
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C. Precluding Same-Gender Couples from Marrying
Impermissibly Burdens Appellants' Fundamental
Right to Marry
1. The Freedom to Marry the Partner of
One's Choosing Is a Long-Recognized,
Well-Established Fundamental Right
More than 150 years ago, this Court eloquently acknowledged the
fundamental nature of marriage as a basic human right:
To marry is one of the natural rights of human nature, insti-
tuted in a state of innocence for the protection thereof; and
was ordained by the great lawgiver of the universe, and not to
be prohibited by man. Yet, human forms and regulations in
marriages are necessary for the safety and security of com-
munity; but those forms and regulations are to be within the
reach of every person wishing to improve them .... 2,8
While acknowledging the propriety of some regulations concerning
marriage, the Court in Newbury emphasized that the freedom to marry
should be available to every person. This Court's insistence that mar-
riage is a basic human right, and its solicitude for the integrity of the
family in the Newbury case, confirm that the freedom to marry has
long been considered a fundamental right in Vermont.
This Court has also acknowledged that the right to terminate a
marital relationship is a core legal right.29 In Miserak v. Terrill, this
Court recognized that the State's monopolization of the means to ter-
minate (and enter) a marriage gives rise to a state obligation to protect
individuals' access to the right to marry, or to end a marriage, and
therefore struck down a statutory filing fee for divorce actions which
effectively prevented indigents from divorcing.220
218. Overseers of the Poor of Newbury v. Overseers of the Poor of Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151,
159 (1829) (emphasis added) (declining even to analyze the legality of a long term
marriage of questionable validity out of respect for the integrity of the family in
question).
219. SeeMiserakv. Terrill, 130 Vt. 7 (1971).
220. In fact, family autonomy more generally has consistently been recognized as a fiun-
damental right in Vermont. See, e.g., In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 303 (1988) (rejecting
preference in guardianship proceedings for appointing mother of a child born out of
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This reverence for the freedom to marry is by no means unique,
but has been matched by federal and state courts in a variety of con-
texts. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that
marriage involves a right "older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system.""2
In considering a law which effectively prohibited indigent, non-
custodial parents who could not satisfy their child support obligations
from marrying, the United States Supreme Court stated, "[0]ur past
decisions make clear that the right to marry is of fundamental impor-
tance .... ,,222 Because the statute interfered directly and substantially
with the right of a class of people to marry, the Court concluded that
it could only be upheld if supported by a sufficiently important state
interest, and if narrowly tailored to effectuate that interestm Because
the law did not satisfy these requirements, the Court struck it down.
wedlock over others, but not for biological father who has developed the requisite
custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child); Paquette v. Paquette,
146 Vt. 83, 92 (1985) ("[Ihe liberty interests of parents and children to relate to
one another in the context of the family, free from governmental interference, are
fundamental rights... ."; upholding the right of a stepparent and stepchild to a con-
tinued relationship after divorce); Guardianship of H.L., 143 Vt. 62, 65 (1983)
(reversing trial court's refusal to appoint guardian ad litem for mother in proceeding
to appoint grandparents as legal guardians for mother's child).
221. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The Griswoldopiion discussed
the fundamental right to privacy, rather than the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court's discussion of the fundamental nature
of marriage buttresses the principle that for the purposes of Common Benefits analy-
sis, marriage is unquestionably a fundamental right. For another decision discussing
the fundamental nature of the marriage right in the context of due process analyses,
see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (listing marriage among basic
privileges "long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of hap-
piness" by free citizens; striking down law prohibiting teaching of foreign languages
to grade school students).
As Appellants argued at the trial level, see PC, supra note 5, at 99-107, Ver-
mont's marriage laws not only violate the Common Benefits Clause, but also run
afoul of the principle, recognized in the above cases and embodied in Chapter I, Arti-
de 1 of the Vermont Constitution, that all persons enjoy certain natural, inherent,
and unalienable rights, predating the State, which cannot be infringed upon by the
State. By withholding from Appellants the freedom to marry their chosen partners,
the State has violated Appellants' inherent rights. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics, No. 3AN-95-6562CI, slip op. at 9 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) ("Here
the court finds that the choice of a life partner is personal, intimate, and subject to
the protection of the right to privacy.").
222. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
223. SeeZablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
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The trial court asserts that "on the federal level, where the right to
marry has been found fundamental, the Supreme Court has consis-• ,224
tently linked marriage to procreation. This conclusion simply is not
true. In fact, in its most recent freedom to marry case, Turner v. Safley,
the United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the ability
to procreate is not essential to the fundamental right to marry.225 The
Court in Turner struck down a prison regulation limiting prisoner
marriages and upheld a prison inmate's constitutional right to marry--
even though inmates are incarcerated and thus cannot procreate. As set
forth above,226 the United States Supreme Court reviewed the many
purposes and protections of marriage and concluded that "[the various]
incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal aspects of the
marriage commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement or
the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals."227 Unless the State is sug-
gesting that this Court would take a narrower view of individual
constitutional rights under the Vermont Constitution than the United
States Supreme Court has taken under the federal constitution, it must
concede that the ability to procreate is not a necessary precondition to
the fundamental right to marry.223
The Court in Turner relied in part on Loving v. Virginia.229 Al-
though the Court in Loving focused much of its discussion on the
invidious racial classifications built into Virginia's anti-miscegenation
laws, the Court emphasized that the statute's impingement on the
freedom to marry was independently unconstitutional:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free [people].... Under our Constitution, the
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
224. PC, supra note 5, at 262.
225. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
226. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
227. Turner, 482 U.S. at 96; see also Grhwold, 381 U.S. at 479 (upholding constitutional
right of married couples not to procreate).
228. Nor do Vermont's marriage laws support the trial court's suggestion that the funda-
mental marriage right only attaches where procreation is possible. See PC, supra note
5, at 263; see also supra note 123.
229. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down prohibition of interracial mar-
riage). See Turner, 482 U.S. at 95.
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resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State. 20
Nearly twenty years prior to the Loving decision, the California
Supreme Court was the first state court in the country to declare un-
constitutional a state anti-miscegenation law. 1' In Perez, the court
recognized that marriage is "a fundamental right of free [people]," and
that "[lI]egislation infringing such rights must be based upon more than
prejudice and must be free from oppressive discrimination to comply
with the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protec-
tion of the laws."
2
Moreover, the court recognized that the "essence of the right to
marry is freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice," '
so that a statute that restricts an individual from marrying a member of
another race "restricts the scope of [the individual's] choice and
thereby restricts [the individual's] right to marry."2 The court prop-
erly dismissed the suggestion that California's anti-miscegenation laws
were not discriminatory because they did not prohibit Caucasians or
people of color from marrying, but evenly restricted the choices of
Caucasians and non-Caucasians concerning whom they could marry.
The court noted:
A member of any of these races may find [himself or herself]
barred by law from marrying the person of [his or her] choice
and that person to [him or her] may be irreplaceable. Human
230. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. Some courts have attempted to distinguish the anti-
miscegenation laws from laws prohibiting marriage between same-gender couples on
the ground that the former involve racial classifications, which are uniquely odious.
See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting analogy
between challenge to prohibition against same-gender marriage and prohibition of
mixed-race marriage). However, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated that
its holding in Loving does not rest solely on the invidious nature of legal dassifica-
tions based on race. As the Court noted in Zablocki, "Although Loving arose in the
context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm
that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals." Zablocki,
434 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added).
231. SeePerezv. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
232. Perez, 198 P.2dat 19.
233. Perez, 198 P.2d at 21 (emphasis added).
234. Id at 19.
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
beings are bereft of worth and dignity by a doctrine that
would make them as interchangeable as trains."'
The various opinions from other state and federal decisions con-
sidering the freedom to marry reinforce the conclusion that under
Vermont's Common Benefits Clause, classifications regarding access to
the freedom to marry burden a fundamental right."
2. The Fundamental Right to Marry the
Partner of One's Choice Cannot Be
Limited by Sex or Sexual Orientation
Unable to argue that the freedom to marry is less than a funda-
mental right, the State claims, and the trial court concluded, that the
constitutional fundamental right to marry is restricted to opposite sex
couples. In short, the State and trial court seek to narrowly define the
marriage right in order to avoid Appellants' claim. By recharacterizing
the issue, the trial court essentially assumes its conclusion.' 7
For example, had the California Supreme Court in the Perez case,
or the United States Supreme Court in the Loving opinion, begun
their analyses by considering whether there was a fundamental, histori-
cal right to miscegenic or interracial marriage, their conclusions would
have been very different. If the United States Supreme Court had be-
gun its discussion in Zablocki by asking whether there is a fundamental
right for "deadbeat dads" to marry, or if it had begun its inquiry in the
Turner case by determining whether incarcerated criminals have a fun-:
damental right to marry, that Court may not have so clearly
enunciated a fundamental right to marry under the United States Con-
stitution. In all of the above cases, only after acknowledging the well-
235. Perez 198 P.2d at 25.
236. The trial court in this case did not attempt to square its conclusion with the Turner,
Loving, and Perez decisions. In fact, the trial court did not even cite any of these criti-
cal freedom to marry cases in its Opinion and Order.
237. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6652CI, slip op. at 9 (Alaska
Feb. 27, 1998) ("The relevant question is not whether same-sex marriage is so rooted
in our traditions that it is a fundamental right, but whether the freedom to choose
one's own life partner is so rooted in our traditions."); see also Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, plurality opinion), 132 (O'Connor, con-
curring), 139 (Brennan, dissenting) (all but two justices rejecting Justice Scalia's
suggestion that courts should define right in question, for purposes of due process
analysis, at "the most specific level [that] can be identified").
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established and general fundamental right to marry did the courts con-
sider the particular types of marriage to determine whether the States
could justify denying a particular class of people the right to marry
their chosen partners."
In this case, the Common Benefits Clause protects the funda-
mental right to marry the partner of one's choice, long pre-dating
Vermont's statehood and recognized by the Vermont Supreme Court,
the courts of sibling states, and the United States Supreme Court. All
of these Appellants have chosen partners to whom they wish to legally
commit themselves, and their chosen partners are all "irreplaceable" to
them. 9 The State cannot demonstrate that its discrimination against
Appellants serves a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly
tailored to serve that objective. 20
D. Precluding Same-Gender Couples from Marrying
Impermissibly Classifies Among Citizens with
Respect to an Important Right and on Highly
Questionable Bases
Even if this Court concludes that the right to marry is not so fun-
damental that the State must satisfy a heightened level of scrutiny to
justify classifications concerning that right, it cannot be doubted that
the freedom to marry one's chosen life partner is a precious one, impli-
cating one of the most personal, intimate and significant choices a
person can make. By the same token, even if this Court concludes that
classifications drawn on the basis of gender or sexual orientation do
238. It would certainly be odd if deadbeat dads and convicted rapists were entitled to
greater constitutional protections than these Appellants. See ESKMIDGE, SAME-SEx
MARRAGE, supra note 49, at 104-09 (refuting suggestion that marriage confers a
state "stamp of approval" on parties thereto).
239. See Perez, 198 P.2d at 25.
240. See Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 265 (1997). Allowing these Appellants to marry
would not open the door to any and all forms of marriage which the State might seek
to restrict. First, even where there is a fundamental right, the State is free to place
narrowly tailored limitations on that right in cases in which it can show a compelling
justification. Second, as the California Supreme Court has noted, "mhe essence of
the right to marry is freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice,"
Peresz 198 P.2d at 21 (emphasis added), and thus would not encompass polygamous
marriages, for example. Third, limitations on the fundamental right to marry are
particularly troublesome when based upon characteristics such as race, sex, or sexual
orientation. See infra Section IV.D.
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not, in and of themselves, call for heightened scrutiny, there is no
doubt that such distinctions create the types of classifications about
which courts are particularly concerned. If this Court considers the
bases for the State's classifications (that is, sex and sexual orientation)
and the right that is implicated (the right to marry) each in isolation,
the Court might overlook the important fact that in this case both the
right in question, and the bases for the State's classifications, are con-
stitutionally significant. Regardless of whether either factor
independently triggers heightened scrutiny in this case, the combina-
tion of both of these defects in the statutory scheme should.2 ' The
State cannot satisfy the heightened scrutiny to which such a classifica-
tion is subject.
CONCLUSION
The right to marry the person we love, the person with whom we
want to share our lives, is one of the most fundamental of all our hu-
man and civil rights. When two adults make the very intimate and
personal decision to commit themselves to one another by marrying,
that decision should not be subject to "legislative hearings and de-
bate."242 Rather, as the trial court recognized, 243 this Court has a duty
to "give effect to the Constitution" by invalidating laws which violate
Vermonters' constitutional rights.24
As one California Supreme Court Justice declared in 1948, when
that court stood up to overwhelming majority sentiment, and a
shameful historical legacy, distinguishing itself as the first state su-
preme court to strike down a state law ban on interracial marriage:
[A] state may [not] legislate to the detriment of a class-a
minority who are unable to protect themselves, when such
legislation has no valid purpose behind it. Nor may the
[legislative] power be used as a guise to cloak prejudice and
241. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1967) (striking down law which
drew invidious racial distinctions and classified with respect to the fundamental right
to marry).
242. State's Motion, supra note 39, at 3; PC, supra note 5, at 9.
243. See PC, supra note 5, at 256-57.
244. Beecham v. Leahy, 130 Vt. 164, 172 (1972) (invalidating Vermont law which crimi-
nalized abortion).
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intolerance. Prejudice and intolerance are the cancers of civi-
lization.2 '
Nina and Stacy, Stan and Peter, and Holly and Lois want to
marry. They want to publicly and legally commit themselves to one
another, and to secure for their respective families the protections and
obligations of civil marriage. Their marriages will take nothing away
from anybody else, and can only strengthen the communities in which
they live. The only things standing in their way are prejudice and in-
tolerance. Appellants respectfully urge this Court to vindicate their
constitutional rights by REVERSING the trial court's judgment for
Appellees, entering Judgment for Appellants, and/or granting such
other relief as is just and proper.
DATED AT Middlebury, Vermont, this 6th day of March, 1998. t
245. Perez, 198 P.2d 17, 32 (Calif. 1948) (Carter, J., concurring).
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